Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 24

their analysis and reaction. All of this information, whether virtual or provided by a trainer,
carries the explanation of simulacra because
military professionals or closely related contractors create and manage all of the virtual systems
and scenarios.34 We encounter the same problem
as the opposing forces problem in that identical
planning methodologies, concepts, language, and
values drive the virtual enemies. Within both, their
explanation reflects our own institutionalisms.
Thus, virtual criminals do what opposing forces
criminals do in “live” training because we explain
them as such. In other words, building a virtual
casino that imitates Venice will still maintain the
same simulacra that the actual Venice casino in
Las Vegas has. Neither reflects the real thing, and
both are copies with no original. However, virtual training simulacrum encounters yet another
problem with context.
Contextually, virtual systems can only create a
narrow spectrum of simulation that orient largely
on physical and quantifiable aspects.35 A virtual
enemy tank can move at the appropriate speed
over accurate virtual terrain and fire weapons at
a rate, range, and damage that quantifiably simulate a real enemy tank. Beyond the superficial
layer that modern entertainment video games
also achieve, our military trainers and contractors
inject in all other motives, information, and relationships. Thus, the simulated criminal elements
in the virtual game are entirely symbolic and
divorced from any real criminal action or process.
While a virtual enemy tank is relatively simplistic,
a virtual suicide bomber or explosives smuggling
network is not. Quantification works with bullets
far better than human behavior, particularly when
different societies interact.36
Most analysis or conclusions that the Army unit
derives from the virtual system are entirely out
of context, other than the quantifiable aspects of
casualties and damaged equipment. The virtual
suicide bomber attacks because we say he does.
Unfortunately, our military has a strong preference for seeking understanding of complexity
through metrics, categorization, and reductionism
where descriptive statistics trump explanation.37
This is why virtual systems are appealing to the
military and how the two-fold training simulacra
occurs without us realizing it.
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All of the recommendations postulated earlier
for the opposing forces also applies to virtual
systems, in that the military professionals and
contractors who build the virtual scenarios could
adapt many of the non-Western concepts and thus
depict simulated context in the virtual system.
Their awareness of their own institutional preferences and the empowerment to shift to alternate
methodologies, concepts, and approaches will
require critical followed by creative thinking.38
A criminal element, while digitally presented,
would operate based upon motives and decisions
that are foreign to how our Army prefers to think
and act. This would require extensive preparation
so that as the virtual criminals move and act, the
contextual information would feed into the Army
unit appropriately. While the metrics within the
virtual system would remain the same, it would
also be largely irrelevant to the Army unit seeking
deeper understanding of a complex environment.
Ultimately, it is simple to track suicide bomber
statistics, but difficult to explain emergent trends
and phenomenon on why the environment is
transforming as observed.39

Ultimately, it is simple
to track suicide bomber statistics, but difficult to explain
emergent trends and phenomenon on why the environment
is transforming as observed.
Since we exploit virtual systems for their ability
to generate descriptive metrics and quantification
that nourishes our institutionalisms at the expense
of enabling our deep understanding, we need not
change the hardware of our virtual training centers.
To transform our Army tra ining strategy, we again
need to change our training philosophy and critically think about the simulacra we produce. At best,
virtual systems remain a cost- and time-effective
January-February 2014 MILITARY REVIEW