Military Review English Edition January-February 2014 | Page 23

DO WE TRAIN TO FAIL? We do not want them building the “Las Vegas perversion” of Venice, rather to build smaller aspects of Venice within the training environment. This requires critical and creative thinking to recognize and then replace decidedly Western methodologies with appropriate rival ones for training. It requires an institutional change generated from the top of the military hierarchy, systemically applied across our entire training program. This also requires a highly professional, experienced training force instead of one featuring first-term recruits. The following examples demonstrate several options where the U.S. Army’s training philosophy could adapt an anti-simulacra approach for execution in national training centers, staff training events, simulations, home-station training, and professional military education at all levels. ● Opposing forces avoid the military decisionmaking process in favor of a methodology that the simulated rival prefers. Instead of merely using buzzwords in our own planning styles, they would adapt the foreign approach. ● Terrorist simulation operates independent of the conventional enemy force in all respects versus the traditional military command structure controlling all simulated actors. ● Criminal actors treat illegal commodity as a simulation—they are rewarded by successfully producing and smuggling it in training scenarios. ● Missions, objectives, and decision making of rivals with eschatological worldviews reflect this rather than extending Western methodologies into simulacra. The actors view the world differently and frame their decisions to match this. This takes mature, experienced professionals—not raw recruits. ● Scenarios with multiple rivals feature competition, cooperation, and distinct command and control functions to emphasize reality versus simulacra. ● OPFOR personnel undergo extensive preparatory training designed to deemphasize institutional preferences of the Western military and introduce rival concepts, language, methodologies, and symbols that break with how we operate as a force. ● Shift large-scale training events away from a highly centralized, top-down simulacrum toward a decentralized, adaptive simulation with competitive, nonaligned rival actors. To become more realistic, we must abdicate more control. This violates our military culture. MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2014 ● All professional military education venues frame the Western approach, and commit class time and instruction on non-Western approaches in a fair, balanced pr