MAGAZINE
SPRING 2019
Graph taken from US FM 3-13 INFORM and INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES
need to get used to terms like probably , highly likely or unlikely , best guess or worst case , and the Black Swan – the highly unlikely that nevertheless becomes an operational reality whether we like it or not .
With this in mind we need to accept the risk of not fully understanding the IE , but creating effects in it , while at the same time trying our best in the given time constraints and restraints , to familiarize ourselves as best as possible with this highly dynamic environment . To do so we first need to carefully analyse actors , i . e . stakeholders and audiences around us ( friendly , neutral and opposing ). From that analysis we probably learn that changing the actors to include mass population ’ s behaviour is much easier to achieve than making a highly armed enemy change his offensive posture or behaviour . This reflective part of the terrain walk in the IE addresses the question to what extent we ( the military / land forces ) are the appropriate actor to respond to the crisis or conflict . The key to success in shaping the IE is public support . With public support we will win or lose the battle . Public support is not a given . We must do something to gain and maintain public support . So , let ’ s get started in peacetime with preparing the operational environment by first of all understanding the IE . What we don ’ t achieve in peacetime will never be achieved in times of crisis and conflict .
Understanding the IE is not just about knowing the actors , we also need to learn and understand about the relationships that actors have with each other , and in particular with the media , as the media will rapidly spread the word ( information ) globally within seconds and 24 / 7 by using highly sophisticated , affordable for everyone , and capable ICT . Actors that control the media and the ICT are the most valuable targets for influence operations . Actors that are influential to the people are high-value targets for our own influence operations , if we start in time , which is usually before we deploy a military force into a theatre of operations and before deployed forces themselves become an actor in the theatre . History shows that a robust military force once deployed is an actor on its own – sometimes even becoming a part of the problem rather than a part of the solution . If we learn anything from military deployments of the past 20 years , then hopefully it is that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis . So , what are the conclusions ?
It took quite some time for the military to learn from geologists and geography how to describe terrain on the ground and make the right conclusions – a specific lexicon needed to be learned and understood . Looking at the complexity of the IE , we need to be prepared to learn a new lexicon that describes the relationships that actors ( friendly , neutral , opposing ) have with each other and with the people ( mass-population ), media , and with ICT . Words Whisper , Actions Thunder is the title of a book written by Russ Normandy on the movement ( behaviour ) of actors on stage and screen , i . e . when observed by others . For military forces in theatre , it means that we need to be capable of mastering thunder by designing our actions in a way that they themselves transmit a message , rather than becoming a message , which is potentially contrary to the wishes or intentions ( words ) of our political leaders . While in the Land Domain a terrain walk has immediate impact on planning and executing an operation , understanding the IE is a must . However , due to its complexity understanding the IE not only takes much more time , but is a prerequisite to enable the military to do the right things right . It is a never ending process that takes into account all we know from a system-ofsystems analysis – for example following the Political , Military , Economic , Social , Infrastructure , Information Model – and takes into account the past , the present , and future developments . To add value to the operational planning process , this terrain walk in the IE has to be initiated at least a year prior to any military action in the same physical environment , and continuously updated .
So what ? Let ’ s leverage peacetime to learn about and better understand the IE with its status , behaviour , and dynamics . The next war will probably be decided in this particular field of the operational environment , which is “ why understanding the people and their motivations will prove decisive in future conflict .”
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