MAGAZINE
FALL 2020
in both defence and attack . All threat MBTs , and many threat ( in particular heavy ) Infantry Fighting Vehicles will likely be equipped with DAS in future . Given the proliferation of top-attack ATGWs , the logical development for future DAS is to provide full top hemisphere protection .
Armour is future-proof . The tank has existed in virtually the same form since its invention in World War I – in essence , an armoured box on two tracks with cannon ( s ). Every army that has tried to get rid of it has reversed course . Those facts are testament to its conceptual durability . Moreover , there is little evidence that the technological paradigm shift required to render it obsolete will occur within our lifetimes . Indeed , DAS has heavily tipped the scales in favour of armour . Armour is also the arm best suited to providing ‘ mothership ’ capability in the Land Domain as armies automate in the coming decades . Network-enabled MBT and IFV with digitised turrets , using current and future communications and information systems , will deliver information and decision superiority for tactical commanders . Armoured digitization confers tempo by enabling targeting from advantageous positioning on the battlefield .
There is clear and enduring evidence that armour is and will continue to be an essential integral part of the combined-arms package . The battlefield is an increasingly complex interaction of many systems , their human users , and the environment ; and maintaining a credible force necessitates a system-of-systems approach . This requires a robust and flexible mixture of Intelligence , Surveillance , Target Acquisition , and Reconnaissance ( ISTAR ), lethal weapons that will overcome modern countermeasures , and the command , control , communications , and computer ( C4 ) capacity to coordinate them . There is no doubt that money will be short in the coming years . Armour sits as a ( relatively expensive ) bid alongside a number of other urgent capability requirements . Nevertheless , existing armoured modernisation programmes must be protected if NATO Allies are to maintain an indigenous armoured capability , and stay competitive in the coming decade and beyond .
The shape of things to come : Future armour The Russian GPV programme ( and before that , Israel ’ s conservation of its Centurion tanks ) shows what can be achieved with old platforms . But looking beyond 2030 , what form should future armour take ? Convergence towards 50 tonnes . We are no longer defending the Fulda Gap . We must therefore prioritise operational and tactical mobility over protection . Modular ( and eventually electric ) armour , DAS , rubber tracks , and lighter , more efficient power trains should help reduce the weight of future MBTs down from the 80 + tonnes deployed weight of some NATO tanks . Conversely , lessons learned in the Ukraine , Gaza strip , and elsewhere argue for heavier IFVs and Armoured Personnel Carriers , based on a common chassis ( per the Russian T-15 and Israeli Namer ).
DAS . APS – ideally capable of defending against top-attack munitions – should be fielded as widely as possible .
Kinetic energy weapons . Given the protection afforded by systems such as DAS and explosive reactive armour , the future force must mount the kinetic energy weapons required to defeat it . This may take the form of 130mm + calibre weapons , or improved projectiles . Future platforms must be designed with this requirement in mind – we cannot wish away the diminishing effectiveness of ATGW .
Common platforms . The Alliance fields a bewildering variety of armoured platforms . This is a perennial complaint that is unlikely to be resolved given national defence industrial priorities . Nonetheless , individual member states at least should seek to reduce the number of platforms in the next generation of armoured vehicles . The Russian Armata series provides a guide . This is key to driving down procurement and running costs . It improves operational and tactical mobility by guaranteeing that all vehicles in a given formation can travel at the same speed , and by reducing the logistic tail of deployed formations . It also satisfies the requirement for heavier IFVs .
Automation . Increased automation and the advent of unmanned systems suggest MBT crews could be reduced from four to three – and perhaps further . However , the cognitive burden of fighting on increasingly ‘ informationalized ’ battlefields lends itself to retaining a larger crew . Four-person crews have traditionally been preferred for their endurance and ‘ fightability ’. It is unclear that a smaller crew is cheaper , and it may be a false economy . Manned / Unmanned Teaming promises much – but may prove a distraction from the
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