MAGAZINE
It lacks the independence and self-sufficiency to be able to choose its tasks to match the level of risk anticipated by its government ( e . g . the disaster that befell UK 29 Brigade in Korea resulted in the formation of the Commonwealth Division ).
With regards to structure , multiple elements capable of a range of tasks clearly provide the commander with more tactical options , than two elements with dissimilar characteristics . The same applies at brigade level – a 1,2 ( triangular ) brigade is a weak construct – weaker still if on its own .
Why armour matters There is clear evidence that having armour when the enemy does not , or possessing superior armour to the enemy , conveys a battlewinning advantage in ground manoeuvre . Most recently , this has been demonstrated on a number of occasions in the Ukraine , but also by the Israeli Defence Forces in the Gaza Strip in 2014 and 2019 . Armour is the only arm that provides 24-hour , all weather ,
FALL 2020 mobile , protected , dedicated , and precision direct fire capability ¹².
Armour is a totemic element of hard power , but it has utility across the spectrum of conflict . Armour has the highest levels of firepower , protection , and tactical manoeuvrability of any land capability . It provides shock effect at great speed and lethality in the attack . It is heavily protected and can survive in the most contested environments , capable of holding ground 24 / 7 in any weather . The tank is psychologically imposing , physically dominant , and capable of highly destructive , precision ( and therefore discriminatory ) direct fires . The primary purpose of armour is to engage and defeat peer and peer + adversaries directly through Close Battle . But its effects have utility across the operate and fight framework too , as historical analysis demonstrates .
The wages of Defensive Aid Suite ( DAS ). MBTs are the only decisive , assured , anti-armour close combat system . Studies conducted by multiple NATO partners have shown that kinetic MBT main armament is the only weapon effective against DAS
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( 12 ) Wheeled vehicles cannot meet the key requirements for close combat against a peer enemy : wheeled tank killers achieve neither the accuracy nor the level of protection of tracked tanks ; and wheeled IFVs are unable to optimally combine the requirements of : medium calibre lethality , capacity for dismounts and high levels of protection and mobility . Attack helicopters are effective tank killers but have limited protection , endurance and are not all weather .