MAGAZINE
FALL 2020
The challenges of interoperability . Where sovereign shortfalls in armoured capability are made good by allies , the attached armour will never be as effective as an organic capability working as part of an indigenous combined-arms team . Tanks add true value to an all-arms grouping . National armies do well at allarms grouping and interoperability at battle group and brigade levels . They are less effective at interoperability with other NATO partners . Furthermore , it is hard to envisage one Ally entrusting the command of their armoured forces to another without sovereign armoured forces under their command . They would not be shouldering the burden of operational activity ( including casualties ), and the credibility of the ‘ unarmoured ’ Ally ’ s two-star command to lead multinational armoured forces runs the risk of being diminished if its commanders and staff had limited or no experience of operating armour .
What is a credible armoured force ? The interdependence of credibility and deterrence has been demonstrated . The ability to constrain an adversary requires the credibility to fight , and a weak armoured capability could leave NATO unable to prevail against , and therefore deter , a peer adversary . A credible armoured capability can be thought of in terms of :
The importance of a balanced Order of Battle ( Orbat ). Why the major European Allies ( UK , Germany , France ) must each be capable of fielding an armoured division . An armoured brigade can deploy independently on joint medium operations . Under a sovereign , multinational or Alliance divisional headquarters , an armoured brigade can also deploy on Warfighting-at-Scale operations . However , experience from Kosovo and Iraq suggests that deploying a single armoured brigade for potential or actual warfighting is inefficient for a number of reasons :
It requires disproportionate logistical support – almost as much of the command and control and combat service support of a division – while producing a fraction of the combat power .
It requires a level of integration with its host division from another nation which is difficult and expensive to achieve ( the counterpart to the preceding discussion on interoperability ).
Technology . Obsolescence is not an option given our lack of mass .
Mass . It is difficult to define what number of armoured vehicles is credible . Small numbers carry obvious risks . Firstly , our forces could simply be bypassed . Secondly , it poses problems for force generation , operations , and operations support . Thirdly , there comes a point when a platform is held in too small a number to risk losing .
Willingness to use – and lose – our forces . This is not purely a political issue – risk aversion remains prevalent in European armies . It is true that our people are our greatest strength . But from a pure deterrence perspective , constantly repeating that message signals loss-aversion to our potential adversaries ¹¹.
Relevance . Forestalling Russian ‘ Fait Accompli ’ operations requires us to be physically present to deter . Armour must either be forward mounted in high-risk areas , or we must do more to enable strategic and operational mobility . The NATO enhanced Forward Presence has arguably proven its worth in this regard .
Force structures . Effective grouping of armour is key – this is discussed in the next section .
So what number of tanks represents a credible force ? This point can be debated , but what is certain is that shrinking our armoured capability – while Russia upgrades and expands theirs – erodes our credibility .
( 10 ) Barrie et al ( 2019 ) Defending Europe : Scenario-Based Capability Requirements For NATO ’ s European Members , IISS , dated April 2019 .
( 11 ) Bronk , Justin ( 2019 ) The Weakness of ‘ People ’ in Deterrence , RUSI .
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German “ LEOPARD 2 ” battle tank