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Russian “ T-72B3 ” battle tank
more dangerous and more likely⁷ .” Moreover , the West starts at a disadvantage in the grey zone , given our commitment to the rules-based international order . New domains such as cyber and space complement – but do not replace – existing ones . An army ’ s core business is the application of violence in the Land Domain ; for all the emphasis placed on multi-domain operations , we must not lose sight of this .
Credibility , deterrence , and armour What is a credible military capability ? In short , for the purposes of this article , a credible military capability is one that deters our potential adversaries , on its own or as part of an alliance . A capability that deters our potential adversaries is also credible to our allies . Conversely , a military that is seen to insufficiently shoulder the burden of deterring our potential adversaries , is not credible to our Allies . Nuclear weapons are a blunt instrument , and they work in deterrence only insofar as non-nuclear ( i . e . conventional ) escalatory steps are in place below it . Armour is an integral part of the conventional deterrent . Without armour , the nuclear deterrent lacks coherence as part of a graduated response .
Without credible conventional deterrence we will find ourselves competing at a severe disadvantage – and armour is central to conventional deterrence . If the Alliance is to retain its global influence , able to protect its values and its members , then it is imperative that NATO ’ s forces are structured to deliver a credible deterrent effect . The collapse of a credible conventional deterrent has severe consequences . Take , for example , the Korean war when North Korean T-34s drove light UN forces all the way to the Pusan perimeter . They were eventually stopped by overwhelming U . S . air and naval gunfire support – neither of which would be available
( 5 ) Giles , Keir ( 2016 ) Handbook of Russian Information Warfare .
( 6 ) Watling , Jack ( 2020 ) By Parity and Presence : Deterring Russia with Conventional Land Forces , RUSI .
( 7 ) Kilcullen , David ( 2020 ) The Dragons and the Snakes , p . 223 .
49 in a conflict in Eastern Europe . The first principle of deterrence is the primacy of cognitive effect⁸ : Deterrence is psychological . And there is no doubt that our potential adversaries think in terms of heavy metal . Armour , therefore , is key to our credibility .
Armour is important to maintaining U . S . -European relations . The ability of NATO ’ s European Allies to field armoured force elements , when coupled with sovereign divisional level of command , enables European allies to play an influential part in operations . It is a key part of the U . S ./ European military relationship . Of note , in the 2019 U . S . Army Modernization Strategy , Close Combat Platforms sit second in the U . S .’ s priority list for investment⁹ . Therefore , by continuing to invest in armoured capability and maintaining coherence with the U . S ., European allies are able to exert influence in Washington , and indeed , Moscow and elsewhere .
Europe cannot – and must not – rely solely on the U . S . for armour . We must think realistically about the future of the transatlantic Alliance To do otherwise would be excessively optimistic . Domestic as well as geo-politics is straining U . S . and European relations . The recently announced U . S . drawdown in Germany is yet another milestone in the U . S . pivot towards China . As a result , there is one single U . S . armoured brigade left in Europe to face down Russian armour . We cannot not rely on it alone to provide Europe ’ s armoured deterrent . By one estimate – made before the COVID crisis and President Trump ’ s announcement – excluding the U . S . contribution there is already a shortfall across NATO ’ s European members of 2,500-3,750 MBTs in the event of a conflict with Russia in the Baltics ¹ ⁰ . This gap is likely to widen . We should not hope that others will fill it .
( 8 ) Watling , Jack ( 2020 ) By Parity and Presence : Deterring Russia with Conventional Land Forces , RUSI .
( 9 Lt Gen Ted Martin ( DCG TRADOC ) speaking at the International Armoured Vehicle Conference , 21-23 Jan 2020 .)