MAGAZINE
FALL 2020
THE IMPORTANCE OF EUROPEAN ARMOUR
French “ LECLERC ” battle tank
By British Army Captain Johan KJELLGREN , COM ARRC Aide de Camp , HQ ARRC
“ After World War III , two Russian tank commanders share a lunch in postwar , occupied Paris . One of them turns to the other , “ Oh Ivan , I ’ m curious . Do you know who won the air war ?”
Introduction COVID has shown what happens to countries that fail to prepare for the worst . If we , the European members of NATO , wish to protect our interests and influence – and avoid war – we must maintain sovereign and credible military capability , with the power to deter our potential adversaries and inspire confidence in our Allies . A credible armoured ¹ capability – within an enabled and robust combined arms order of battle ( ORBAT ) – is central to a credible military capability . Such a capability is a prerequisite to the luxury of competing in the liminal space .
Situation : Potential Adversarial Forces Investment and export in armour amongst our potential adversaries is significant and growing . Our potential adversaries recognise that there are no other battlefield capabilities that can deliver the dedicated ( to the ground commander ), 24 / 7 , all-weather effects that heavy armoured forces provide . Russia has repeatedly demonstrated their intent to exploit the utility of heavy armoured forces . They used it in Chechnya , Georgia , Ukraine , and continue to us it in Syria . Russia , and other potential adversaries , continue to invest in their modernisation . The majority of NATO ’ s potential adversaries continue to retain and modernise tanks and tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicles ( IFVs ).
The pacing threat . Russia ’ s T-72B3 represents the pacing threat . It is mobile , well-protected , and lethal . It features the Arena-E Active Protection System ( APS ² – more on this later ) which provides soft and hard-kill counter-Anti-Tank Guided Weapon ( ATGW ) and Rocket Propelled Grenade capability . It also features Kontakt-5 Explosive Reactive Armour , upgraded fire control and targeting systems , a new engine , steering system , and better radios . With its relatively light weight ( approximately 45 tonnes vs . the Challenger 2 at 80 + tonnes ) and ability to snorkel to a depth of five meters , it has better operational mobility than NATO Main Battle Tanks ( MBTs ). Above all , it exists in large numbers alongside an abundance of other , high-quality Russian MBTs . It ’ s estimated that Russia fields nearly 1,000 modern MBTs ³ in the Western Military Distric alone , and another approximately 2,000 across their total force4 – all with the flexibility and infrastructure to redeploy rapidly . These threats are not limited to Russia alone . Russia is an enthusiastic exporter of tanks , ready to equip willing buyers . China is actively expanding and upgrading its armoured fleet . And Daesh , they used captured Russian-made MBTs in Syria .
Lest we forget . Russian military thinking subordinates information operations to the application of hard power⁵ . Information operations , offensive cyber capabilities , economic sanctions , and soft power all contribute to effective deterrence . But they are force multipliers for hard power and not its enablers⁶ . Although they have developed innovative and threatening nonconventional capabilities and methods , Russia and China are pursuing a twin-track approach . “ We can ’ t simply stop building ships or buying tanks and aircraft and go fully asymmetric instead ,” said David Kilcullen in his book Dragon and Snakes . “ If we did that , we would soon be outclassed conventionally , making war both
( 1 ) The terms armoured infantry , armour , and heavy armour are used interchangeably to refer to armoured ( main battle tank , infantry fighting vehicle , and armoured cavalry ) capability . The terms do not refer to medium weight capabilities such as Stryker brigades and other NATO equivalents .
( 2 ) For the purposes of this note , APS and DAS ( Defensive Aid Suite ) will be used
48 interchangeably . ( 3 ) T-72B3 , T-80 , T-90 . Numbers of the advanced T-14 are unknown but likely to be small .
( 4 ) Deduced from Harris , Catherine and Kagan , Frederick W . ( 2018 ) Russia ’ s Military Posture : Ground Forces Order of Battle , ISW .