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FALL 2020 aggression and which will lead him to conclude that an unacceptable degree of risk would be involved regardless of the nature of his attack⁴ .” If deterrence failed , the 1967 Strategic
Concept proposed three broad military responses to aggression : direct defense , deliberate escalation , and general nuclear response . Importantly , MC 14 / 3 did not delve too deeply into the “ how ”. Instead , its cogent appreciation of the Soviet threat and a broad description of how the Alliance should deter and defend against it served as an enduring foundation for detailed planning efforts that followed .
Implementing a Strategic Concept , Then and Now
Remembering the old adage that one “ never steps in the same river twice ” is central to the implementation of any strategic concept . What made MC 14 / 3 an enduring , and valuable , document was a shared understanding of what it was not . The 1967 Strategic Concept acknowledged that operational and tactical constraints , restraints , capabilities , and balances will ebb and flow , and therefore did not attempt to be overly prescriptive . While the broad description of the Soviet ’ s preferred approach and the outlines of the Alliance response helped scope detailed requirements for planning and resourcing a military response , these details remained separate from and subordinate to MC 14 / 3 itself . The value of this distinction endures ; a division between any Strategic Concept and its detailed implementation is particularly important during persistent competition below the threshold of armed conflict . Such persistent competition is a dynamic seen today , and in many ways echoes the relationship between NATO and the Warsaw Pact through much of the Cold War . In contrast to campaigning through armed conflict , where a defined , achievable military end can be achieved , strategic competition below the threshold of war is an enduring , interactive dynamic where both sides continuously adapt and shift their approaches and postures in an attempt to gain an advantage that in turn enables other elements of national power⁵ .
( 4 ) MC 14 / 3 : Enclosure 1 , page 10 ( 5 ) US Joint Staff Doctrine Note 1-19 , Competition Continuum , ( 3 June 2019 )
( 6 ) Richard Berkebile , “ Military Strategy Revisited : A Critique of the Lykke Formulation ,” Military Review online exclusive ( May 2018 )
The implementation of any strategic concept therefore requires continual readjustment and adaptation . In contrast to an ends-focused approach that balances ways and means to achieve a prescribed endstate , in persistent competition NATO must instead continuously seek and maintain a position of advantage relative to its potential adversary⁶ . This position of advantage is not aggressive — it simply denies NATO ’ s adversaries the ability to use military threats to underwrite other activities intended to fracture the unity of the Alliance and undermine the sovereignty of its constituent members⁷ . Importantly , peacetime competition is never militarily “ won ”— an endstate is never reached . Rather , through the continued , demonstrated ability to counter adversarial efforts to undermine the Alliance , such a strategy deters overt aggression and minimizes the benefits of militarilyunderwritten subversion⁸ . Through the Cold War , this was accomplished through the continual adaptation of containment , an approach which deterred Soviet military aggression and allowed the inherent ( and unsolvable ) moral , social , and economic contradictions of Communism to result in its ultimate collapse⁹ . Deterrence in peacetime competition is not a military endstate that can be achieved with finality , even given unconstrained resources . Rather , it is a continuously shifting perception in the minds of our competitors — a perception of NATO ’ s military capability and its willingness to collectively use force in defence of any Ally . This perception evolves as the appetite for risk , military capabilities , and assumptions about NATO ’ s resolve and capabilities are assessed and reassessed by our potential adversaries . Military operations during peacetime competition that probe for weakness in both capability and resolve are a pattern of competitive behavior that has reemerged in the past decade . While fixed in purpose , such probing is variable in its nature , intensity , and timing . Therefore , for deterrence to be credible it must continuously adapt to ensure that such probes are met with ready , capable , and relevant force that demonstrate the Alliance ’ s ability and will to defend against aggression . In the late 1960 ’ s the implementation of MC 14 / 3 was outlined in a series of
47 subordinate plans and concepts that built the deterrence needed to ensure the security of the Alliance . The measures to implement 1967 Strategic Concept were detailed in a 1969 Military Committee document , MC 48 / 3 , entitled Measures to Implement the Strategic Concept for the Defense of the NATO Area . This document expanded on MC 14 / 3 and provided roles and tasks to the commands that made up NATO at the time . In the land domain , implementation focused on the defence of the Central Region of West Germany , the Netherlands , Belgium , and Luxembourg , particularly “ the North German Plain , [ which is ] particularly favourable for the enemy to make maximum use of armoured and mechanised units .” Similar detailed planning considerations in all domains and all regions were identified as direct outcomes of the 1967 Strategic Concept and in turn formed the basis for operational plans and force posture .
Enduring relevance In contrast to the Strategic Concept itself , which remained valid from 1967 through the remainder of the Cold War , the detailed , subordinate operational plans and associated force posture were updated routinely . The broad description of the threat to the Alliance laid out in 1967 remained both valid and relevant throughout this period , largely due its explicit elevation above the operational and tactical levels of war . The operational and tactical level planning , however , was updated and revised continuously as the competitive balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces shifted . This stratification between concept and plan ensured that NATO ’ s approach was both coherent and flexible . Rather than attempting to be the end-all , be-all of NATO planning , the Alliance ’ s 1967 Strategic Concept was an explicitly bounded but enduring concept that served as a capstone underneath which detailed plans , exercises , capabilities , and posture could be developed , revised , and integrated in a coherent manner . As the Alliance adapts to the ever-evolving threats of the third decade of the 21st century , understanding the hierarchy and delineation of strategy , concept , and plan that was laid out over 50 years ago in MC 14 / 3 remains a valuable guide . LC
( 7 ) Valery Gerasimov , “ Thoughts on Future Military Conflict ”
( 8 ) Valery Gerasimov , “ The Value of Science Is in the Foresight New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations ”
( 9 ) John Lewis Gaddis , Strategies of Containment : A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War , ( Oxford University Press , 2005 ).