latter being especially important , according to the new Russian doctrine , information superiority is essential for achieving victory on the battlefield in a modern war .
The importance of non-military means in conflicts will increase dramatically . According to the Russian General Staff , the ratio of non- military to military means is expected to be 4 to 1 . As a result , the line between the state of peace and the state of war will be blurred . This idea is similar to the older Communist idea of permanent struggle .
Alongside traditional military forces , a wide variety of paramilitary , special and insurgency forces will be used to achieve political objectives . An important and the most visible role in fighting will be carried out by irregular military formations , private military companies and insurgency forces with special forces supported and funded from outside . The open and visible participation of own military forces may take part only at the final stages of an operation to finalise the direct takeover , or if not possible / acceptable , as peacekeeping forces .
The implementation of the doctrine will be carried out by new forms and methods , such as :
• Military actions will start with peacetime units ;
• Non-contact clashes of joint forces with high manoeuvrability ;
• Annihilation of the adversary ’ s military and economic powers by precise shorttime strikes against military and civilian infrastructures ;
• Massive use of high-precision weapons , special operation forces , weapons based on new physical principles , and the use of armed civilians ;
• Simultaneous impacts on an adversary ’ s military units and objects across the entire breadth of its territory ;
• Simultaneous battles on land , at sea , in the air and space , and in the global information space ;
• The use of asymmetric and indirect methods ;
• The command of forces in a unified information space .
After the publication of the new Russian military doctrine there were numerous discussions about the Russian new generation warfare , especially in relation to the crisis in Ukraine . Some analysts call it hybrid warfare , some call it the full spectrum conflict , asymmetrical , unconventional , or nonlinear warfare . At the same time , these new elements — information activities , physical and informational provocations , the use of special operation forces , paramilitary units , and internal oppositions , economic pressure and deception — have been part of Russian or Soviet strategies for a long time . As stated by general Gareev :
All the time the international confrontation was implemented through the use of different forces and methods such as intelligence , counterintelligence , deception , manipulation , disinformation and others . Only some of our philosophers think that all these non-military tools appeared today ...
Of course , Russian / Soviet strategists have been more or less successful in their implementation of these elements and making them work together . The crisis in Ukraine in general , especially the takeover of Crimea shows an increase in abilities and capabilities to implement the doctrinal views first written down by General Gareev in 1995 .
Chekinov and Bogdanov divide the new-generation war into two phases — an opening and a closing period . The opening phase starts with an intensive and centrally coordinated non-military campaign against a target country . The campaign includes diplomatic , economic , ideological , psychological , and information measures . In addition , a heavy propaganda campaign is conducted to depress the enemy population , to disrupt the government and to demoralise the enemy ’ s armed forces . The actions also include the deception and bribing of governmental officials and members of the armed forces . In addition to a large-scale intelligence and information gathering , different covert operations to create chaos and instability are launched . By the authors , the enemy would have the main governmental and military command centres destroyed , critical infrastructure heavily damaged to the extent of non-governance . The second or the closing phase consists of the open entrance of occupying forces into the country and destruction of remaining points of resistance . Chekinov and Bogdanov consider the first phase of operation more critical and important than the concluding part . This supports Gerasimov ’ s view that non-military means play the main role in future conflicts .
Information activities have the key role in future conflicts . According to the Russian theorists , the war will be conducted in the two domains : in physical and informational realms . The decisive battle is to be fought in the latter one . Interestingly , according to Gerasimov , information means are not clearly identified as military or non-military means .
Even if the new Russian military doctrine seems to resemble a revolutionary approach to warfighting , it is still old wine in a new bottle . The Russian military thinking has always been more close to Sun Tzu ’ s military thinking rather than to the Western understanding of conducting wars . The key difference today is the Russian increased ability to carry out their doctrinal principles successfully as it was seen in Crimea . In previous post-Cold War conflicts , Russia employed its traditional doctrine and was not impressively successful . Thus , Crimea may either be an exception to the norm — or a new norm for the West to reckon with .
What can we conclude from this analysis of the new military doctrine and Gerasimov ’ s views ? First , the Russian military maintains its traditional role as defender of the homeland . Second , the key role in future conflicts has been assigned to the
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