CHANGING CONCEPTS OF WAR :
Russias New Military Doctrine and the Concept of Hybrid Warfare
An analyst looks at code in the malware lab of a cyber security defense lab . © REUTERS
The following is an excerpt from the publication , “ Russian Information Campaign Against the Ukrainian State and Defence Forces ” originally published on 9 February 2017 by the NATO Strategic Communiction Centre of Excellence . The full publication can be found at www . stratcomcoe . org
President Vladimir Putin approved the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation on 26 December 2014 . This document takes into account the fundamentals of other key strategy documents : the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020 , the Concept of Foreign Policy until 2020 , the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation until 2020 , the Development Strategy of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation , and others .
The Chief of the Russian General Staff General Valeriy Gerasimov introduced the key elements of the new military doctrine to the wider public in January 2013 . The new doctrine was most probably tested during the conflict in Ukraine . In his speech , Gerasimov emphasised the lessons learned from the Arab Spring and other conflicts . This was likely an attempt to legitimise his views and future actions by building on what others have done previously .
The second chapter of the Russian military doctrine defines the military risks and threats for the Russian Federation and describes also the Russian understanding of the characteristics of a modern military conflict . It is the key to understand Russian official views on modern war and fighting . By this doctrine , modern military conflicts are characterised by :
• Integrated use of military force , political , economic , informational , and other non-military tools , implemented with extensive use of the protest potential of the population , and special operations forces ;
• Massive use of weapons systems and military technology , precision , hypersonic weapons , electronic warfare , weapons based on new physical principles comparable in efficiency with nuclear weapons , information management systems , unmanned aircrafts , autonomous marine vehicles , controlled robotic weapons , and military equipment ;
• Impact on the enemy throughout the depth of its territory simultaneously in the global information space , in the air , on land , and at sea ;
• Selectivity and a high degree of destruction of objects , speed of manoeuver and fire of troops ( forces ), the use of various mobile groups of troops ( forces );
• Reducing the time parameters to prepare for hostilities ;
• Strengthening the centralisation and automation the command and control of troops and weapons as a result of the transition from a strictly vertical command and control system to the global network of automated management systems of troops ( forces ) and weapons ;
• The creation of a permanent war zone in the territories of warring parties ;
• Participation of irregular armed groups and private military companies in hostilities ;
• The use of indirect and asymmetric methods of action ;
• The use of externally funded and managed political forces and social movements .
The similar approach is also seen in General Gerasimov ’ s statement describing the modern military conflict as an integrated application of military , political , economic , informational , and other powers by state or non-state actors to achieve their political goals . Therefore , warfare as understood by Russian military leaders is not ‘... the continuation of politics by other ( military ) means ...’ but an integral part of politics .
For Russians modern wars will be fought on all levels of an adversary ’ s territory — on land , at sea , in the air and in space , as well as in the global information space . The
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