Security Services and Special Forces . This was apparent in Crimea and has been apparent in Eastern Ukraine where Russian military units have been assigned a supportive , secondary role to the GRU / FSB . Third , all branches of Russian government , especially the executive branch , is even more heavily involved in the war effort than on previous occasions . Their role is to provide the political conditions for the forces in fight . It has to be noted , though , that while fulfilling this role today , different branches of the Russian government have strayed off the traditional paths of their colleagues in other countries . In support of the information warfare campaign , it now appears that especially the executive branch has clearly crossed the fine line between classic diplomatic ambiguity and lying .
Fourth , the term ‘ hybrid warfare ’ is as misleading for Western audiences as it does not mean the same thing as the Russian term ‘ new generation warfare ’. The word ‘ hybrid ’ derives from Latin ‘ hybridae ’ which means ‘ a mongrel , half breed ’. Hence , hybrid warfare should be the offspring of 1 ) warfare as an act of execution or implementation and 2 ) some concept or idea from a particular realm or sphere of life ( economy , social affairs , information etc .). In order to achieve goals or implement national interests via the aforementioned spheres , a country may decide to utilise the ways and means of warfare within these realms .
Perhaps one of the earliest academic uses of the term ‘ hybrid warfare ’ was in 2002 by William J . Nemeth in an unpublished Naval Postgraduate School ’ s master ’ s thesis titled “ Future war and Chechnya : a case for hybrid warfare ”, which did not reach wider audiences . The term became more public in academic literature in 2005 after an article by Lt . Gen . James N . Mattis and Frank Hoffman , “ Future Warfare : The Rise of Hybrid Warfare . The term did not spread until the conflict between Lebanon and the Hezbollah in 2006 , which was somewhat mistakenly labelled as a ‘ hybrid conflict ’. After that conflict , ‘ hybrid warfare ’ was used to describe activities similar to those of unconventional warfare as defined by the US and NATO with one clear distinction — there was no obvious state power behind it . With the annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Eastern Ukraine , the comprehension of ‘ hybrid warfare ’ changed and it was used to refer to a comprehensive approach of using military , non-military , and non-official means to wage warfare .
There was now a clearly identified state power behind the events . When we compare the phases of Russian new generation warfare to the phases of US unconventional warfare , we can see many similarities ( Fig . 1132 ). Despite apparent differences in the titles of the phases , the contents of the Russian and US approaches are quite similar . Specifically :
• Russian subphases 1.1 and 1.2 match several activities in the US phases 1 and 2 .
• Russian subphases 1.2 and 1.3 serve the same purpose as the conduct of PsyOps in US phase 2 .
• Russian subphases 1.3 and 1.4 are comparable to the PsyOps efforts of US phase 4 .
• The build-up described in the US phase 5 occurs during the Russian subphases 1.2 to 1.5 .
• The Russian subphase 1.5 makes the conflict and the actual forces behind it open to the public as is the case of the US phase 6 .
• The Russian subphases 2.1 and 2.2 match US phase 6 .
• Mop-up operations of the Russian subphase 2.3 are one of the measures undertaken in the US phase 7 .
Despite differences in timing and sequencing , the ways , means , and ends of the Russian and US approaches are largely similar for such operations . Perhaps the only major difference we can identify is that events in the first phase may occur simultaneously with those in the second phase according to Chekinov and Bogdanov . The US field manual stipulates that the phases should ideally occur sequentially , even though one or more may be skipped if conditions permit .
Hence we should stop using the term ‘ hybrid warfare ’ and refer to the Russian campaign in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as unconventional warfare , at least in Western terms of reference . The most notable difference between Russian and US conduct of unconventional warfare is the Russia ’ s heavy emphasis on information activities . When we compare Russian Special Forces with those of the US and the vast difference in capabilities and experience between them , this makes sense . The sudden increased in focus and reliance on information activities in the Russian military doctrine is an indicator that Russia is well aware of the developing situation and has found alternate ways and means of conducting unconventional warfare .
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