“Should IS be significantly dented by the westernbacked campaign, … Nusra looks best placed to
fill the vacuum in the north, central and eastern
parts of Syria.”
“… Nusra has even shown itself willing to work
with the international community in that region,
last year working with Qatar in negotiations to
release 45 Fijian UN peacekeepers taken hostage
in the Golan in September.”
“In the long-term, [opposition media activist from
Idlib, Juma al-Qassem] believes the Syrian people’s
rejection of IS will push the opposition to embrace
Nusra. … And with any possible umbrella deal
likely to include Islamist representatives, Nusra,
better armed, funded and organised, would be
best positioned to fill that role.”
The Carnegie Endowment - A major
crusader think-tank
pragmatism. The group has been collaborating
with a wide variety of local forces that are not
pushed to fight under its umbrella. Instead, they
fight with Nusra as allies – a radical departure
from the Islamic State’s model, which does not
tolerate collaboration unless absolutely necessary.
This approach has enabled the Nusra Front to
widen its network of support quickly, including
the addition of some Free Syrian Army brigades
in Aleppo, Hama, and Daraa.”
This description of the Jawlānī front was mirrored
in another piece written by the crusaders of Middle
East Eye on “30 April 2015.” After describing the
“pragmatism” of the Jawlānī front (cooperation
with everyone and non-implementation of the
hudūd), the author said, “Nusra could also
benefit from US airstrikes against IS. The US
listed the Nusra Front a terrorist organisation in
December 2012, long before the emergence of
IS, but since last year the US-led intervention in
Syria and Iraq has largely focused on the aim of
degrading and ‘ultimately destroying’ IS. While
coalition airstrikes have also targeted Nusra
positions, the group is less of a priority for the
US-led campaign.”
The policy of relying upon the jihād claimants
against the Islamic State had already been adopted
by some of the Arab tawāghīt. The Carnegie
Endowment wrote on “20 April 2015,” “The
Islamic State seeks to infiltrate Jordan in many
ways. Its most effective way of establishing itself is
not by attacking across the border, but by coopting
Jordanian extremist factions and exploiting the
simmering social discontent among Jordanian
youth. To counter these trends, the government
has sought to exploit divisions between al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State, releasing some clerics [alMaqdisī and al-Filistīnī] aligned with the former
group and allowing them a degree of media
visibility.”
This policy was even suggested for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, as the Islamic State’s presence
there threatened regional stability. The crusaders
of War on the Rocks wrote on “13 April 2015,”
“This much is clear, however: Mullah Omar still
matters – especially in South Asia, where two
important developments are playing out. Both
are directly tied to stability, which is Washington’s
chief interest in the region. And regardless of
his fate, Mullah Omar will have an impact on
each of them. Development number one is the
deepening influence of the Islamic State in South
Asia. … The second key trend is Kabul’s pursuit
dabiq
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