IN THE WORDS OF
THE ENEMY
One of the most despicable
positions a jihād claimant can find
himself in is that the crusaders and
Arab tawāghīt begin to consider
him a possible alternative to the
Khilāfah or a partial “solution” to
preventing its expansion. When
one hears that the crusaders now
consider this or that party of jihād
claimants as a potential ally serving
the crusaders’ interests against the
Islamic State, then wash your hands
of that group and flee from them
with your religion as you would flee
from a leper!
The problem is not that the crusaders
consider these jihād claimants
to have a common enemy – one
whom the Muslims pronounce
takfīr upon, such as the Rāfidah, the
Nusayriyyah, the secularists, and
the proponents of democracy… and
whom the crusaders fear more than
the Muslims for material reasons,
such as their Safawī enemy’s desire
to produce nuclear weapons. But
rather, they consider their common
enemy to be the Islamic State that
the shahīd leaders these jihād
claimants ascribe themselves to had
praised repeatedly.
Below you will find the words of
crusader think-tanks, analysts,
advisors, and journalists, suggesting
to their American crusader
leadership the necessity of preserving
jihād-claimant heads and parties
and the building of relationships
with them because in doing so they
would serve the crusade against the
Islamic State.
Amongst the first to present this idea
to the American crusader leadership
was the Jew Barak Mendelsohn.
60 ENEMY‘S WORDS
In an article for Foreign Affairs
published on “13 February 2014,”
he said, “The United States
should also relax its conditions for
cooperation with the Islamic Front
and even consider closer contact
with JN [“Jabhat an-Nusrah”] as
they both work to bring down
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
That will put even more pressure
on ISIS, while allowing the United
States and the Islamist groups to get
familiar with each other, understand
each other’s perspectives and fears,
and possibly even mitigate human
suffering in Syria. Those ties would
surely be valuable when it comes
time to reconstruct the country.”
(Note: The “Islamic” Front was
already cooperating with the agents
of the US – Qatar, Turkey, and the
Saudis – but not directly and openly
then with the US itself.)
This concept was graphically
mapped out by the crusaders of the
Wall Street Journal on “29 August
2014” in a piece titled “United
Against Islamic State.” They
explained the map by briefly saying,
“Fear over the spread of Islamic State
means parties often at odds now
share a common enemy… Parties
that display friction or outright
aggression toward one another are
finding themselves aligned in a
desire to counter Islamic State…
The greatest odd bedfellow of all:
Islamic State threatens al-Qaeda as
well as the West, meaning that, in
fact, al-Qaeda and the US now have
a shared enemy.”
The crusaders of the Small Wars
Journal described the phenomenon
briefly on “22 March 2015,” “Our
rebel allies are predominately Sunni-
based and include a healthy dose
of Al-Qaida – our sworn enemy in
Ira[q] and Afghanistan has somehow
managed to be on our side in Syria.”
And after it being merely a merging
of interests against the Islamic State
– not against kuffār – different
crusaders began to emphasize the
need for a proper building of such
a relationship.
A major crusader think-tank – the
Carnegie Endowment – wrote
on “24 March 2015,” “The West
currently sees the Nusra Front as
a threat. But Nusra’s pragmatism
and ongoing evolution mean that
it could become an ally in the fight
against the Islamic State. … Instead
of putting Nusra and the Islamic
State in the same basket, the West
should look beyond the Nusra
Front’s ideological affiliation and
encourage its pragmatism as it seeks
an end to the Syrian conflict.”
This long piece explains the
“pragmatism” of the Jawlānī front
in detail: Cooperation with other
factions is unconditional and
“ideology” is not imposed by force.
The author of the article says in
praise of the Jawlānī front, “…
Nusra does not impose its ideology
wholesale. While local sources say
80 percent of the Islamic State’s
adherents in Syria are not Syrians,
Nusra members are mostly Syrian
and therefore more aware of regional
variations in culture and customs.
This allows Nusra to modify
the implementation of ideology
according to those variations …”
“… The Nusra Front’s ability to
deliver results is largely driven by its