The Taliban under the shade
of the tawāghīt
of reconciliation with the Taliban. … Late last
year, US officials suggested that American forces
will no longer actively pursue Mullah Omar. They
intimated that he no longer poses a direct threat
to US troops. Taken at face value, this reasoning
suggests that Washington is simply not that
concerned about him anymore … Then again,
the US decision not to go after Omar may be an
indication that it still regards him as relevant and
useful. Washington may conclude that any and all
roads to peace talks in Afghanistan lead through
him, and that apprehending or attacking him
would be a strategic disaster.”
policy toward al Qaeda, particularly its targeting of
Zawahiri. Destabilizing al Qaeda at this time may
in fact work against US efforts to defeat ISIS.”
Worst of all, Barak Mendelsohn wrote an article
titled “Accepting Al Qaeda – The Enemy of the
United States’ Enemy” for Foreign Affairs on
“9 March 2015.” In it, he said, “Since 9/11,
Washington has considered al Qaeda the greatest
threat to the United States, one that must be
eliminated regardless of cost or time. After
Washington killed Osama bin Laden in 2011, it
made Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s new leader,
its next number one target. But the instability in
the Middle East following the Arab revolutions and
the meteoric rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and alSham (ISIS) require that Washington rethink its
“In order for US President Barack Obama to fulfill
his promise to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ ISIS,
he must weaken ISIS’ control of Mosul, Raqqa,
and other large population centers, as well as stop
its expansion. Inadvertently, the administration’s
cautious approach to military intervention makes
al Qaeda – which views ISIS as a renegade offshoot
– an important player in curtailing ISIS’ growth.”
62 ENEMY‘S WORDS
“… Today, al Qaeda, although still a grave threat,
is only one of several emanating from the Middle
East. Washington must not only contain Iran’s
hegemonic aspirations, which threaten US allies,
but also fight ISIS’ expansion. Washington’s
failure to balance these diverging interests became
apparent when it made the mistake of coupling the
bombing of ISIS targets in Syria with attacks on al
Qaeda’s Khorasan group …”
“… As long as Zawahiri is alive, the leaders of
al Qaeda’s branches who are beholden to him by
personal oath are less likely to shift allegiances and
join ISIS. But if and when Washington succeeds in