Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 86

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
rectify the situation. On the one hand,
Putin can speculate, “northern Caucasian
fighters participating in the Syrian
war will return to their homeland and
continue the fight in native Russian soil
against Russians. This is one of the primary
reasons for military intervention
in Syria” (Crosston 2018, 146). Putin’s
appeal for respect and legitimacy in
Syria is displayed in another personal
interview:
we very much fear that Syria
will fall apart like Sudan. We
very much fear that Syria will
follow in the footsteps of Iraq
and Afghanistan. This is why we
would like the legal authority to
remain in power in Syria, so that
Russia can cooperate with Syria
and with our partners in Europe
and the United States to consider
possible methods to change
Syrian society, to modernize the
regime and make it more viable
and humane. (Sochor 2018, 59)
On the other hand, the full-spectrum
Russian propaganda machine is
able to invade the cognitive arenas of
select audiences with the message that
“the Islamic state is a U.S. project to redraw
the political map of the Middle
East, or that it is used by Washington
to either boost America’s supremacy
in this part of the world or destabilize
Russia’s Muslim dominated areas
in the northern Caucasus, as well as
Russia’s sphere of influence in Central
Asia” (Crosston 2018, 146). It is with
carefully projected and purposely engineered
statements such as these that
Putin influences and solidifies specific
impressions within target audiences.
The forced categorization and social
comparison relating to enemy imagery
further entrench Putin’s supporters and
distance those against him. With these
efforts, he not only grows and isolates
his supporting base, but he also consolidates
his power and popularity. More
importantly, these actions facilitate his
desired tectonic shifting toward the
return of a more straightforward bipolar
international paradigm. These
steps are one where the new Russia can
compete at the military, political, and
cultural echelons that it deems to have
deserved. Anchoring this simple yet effective
message in a Western television
interview, Putin expressed his belief
that “the world will be predictable and
stable only if it’s multi-polar” (Feklyunina
2008, 615).
Eicher, Pratto, and Wilhelm
(2012) note that “people perceive members
of another group as threatening,
they tend to demonize the group,
which allows them to justify uncooperative
even violent behavior towards this
group and thereby maintain a positive
self-image. Image Theory further states
that images are used to filter information
and interpret actions of others thus
leading to a reconfirmation of the image”
(128). Putin relied on this causation
to start rebuilding his country’s status
and structures. He personally targeted
various audiences and groups for either
greater inclusion or deliberate isolation,
ensuring the hardened pride and loyalty
of an active in-group that will fulfill
not only Russians but also his motives.
At first glance, his methodical military
and political decisions can be perceived
simply as power politics. However, a
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