Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 87
A New Russian Realpolitik: Putin’s Operationalization of Psychology and Propaganda
major detailed examination uncovers
rather salient constructivist inner
workings. Using this unique blend of
realism and political psychology, Putin
knowingly expanded and solidified an
in-group population, further ensuring
his popularity and reducing any friction
or opposition to his domestic or international
agenda.
Through various political power
moves and influence operations, Russia’s
leadership has projected a clear international
and domestic image. A variety
of actions offer the entire continuum
of Russian society a sense of pride and
hope for the future. By operationalizing
image theory, Putin provides a perception
of a model of society and government
that challenges the Western
unipolar paradigm. However, if Putin’s
weaponizing of image theory becomes
tainted or exposed by Western institutions
or the credible internal opposition
as a farce or extreme manipulation, the
current paternal hold on his subjects
may weaken. The failure to highlight
the developed “us versus them” byproducts
of image theory may allow Putin’s
in-group to create cracks displaying divisions,
thus forcing segments to find
positive reinforcement and social mobility
from an out-group willing to fill
the new void.
Putin’s Operationalizing
of a Unique Identity
and Social Identity
The Russian motivation and desire
to elevate their own group’s
status should be in itself enough
for a definite intergroup discrimination
against the world’s only current superpower.
However, Putin’s task “is more
complicated, being the leader of a nation
in profound transition from Soviet
communist ideology to a new Russian
national identity that attempts to bridge
1000 years of Russian history, spanning
eras of the czars to powerful oligarchs”
(Stone 2017, 3). Hence, an enhanced
differentiation, amplified by deliberate
propaganda techniques and influencing
methods, is required to accomplish this
undertaking.
By operationalizing Stets and
Burke’s (2000) work, and by allowing
the combined theory to address macroand
micro-level social processes, this
article emphasizes and forms the necessary
relationships to a specific Russian
social identity and the particular
identity that the current Russian leader
depicts. The combined theory employment
allows the investigation of groups,
roles, depersonalization, self-verification,
self-esteem, and self-efficacy in
Russian society and its leadership apparatus.
The approach also provides both
the concept, salience, and critical components
needed to link Russian propaganda,
active measures, and deliberate
political action to the anchoring and
amplification of the internal and the
external cognitive dynamics within the
purposely differentiated groups.
Petersson’s (2017) research regarding
Putin and legitimacy successfully
linked “mythscapes” and the particular
Russian identity through the
Russian leader’s influence methods and
emotional allegiance to an unambigu-
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