Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 85

A New Russian Realpolitik: Putin’s Operationalization of Psychology and Propaganda
interests to remain part of Russia.
As things stand today, any discussion
of any status outside the
framework of Russia is out of
the question .... Only one thing
works in such circumstances—
to go on the offensive. You must
hit first and hit so hard that your
opponent will not rise to his feet.
(Gevorkyan et al., 2000, 168)
In 2008, Putin’s unexpected military
intervention in the independent
state of Georgia seemingly caught the
West off guard. The Russian military’s
full display and integration of hard and
soft power highlighted the new efficacy
of Putin’s cleverly engineered state. Despite
the West’s attempts to characterize
Russia’s actions as illegal and aggressive,
invoking a deliberately built enemy image
for his domestic audience and diaspora,
the Russian president successfully
solidified the narrative that he and the
Russian military were in fact “protecting
the lives and dignity of our citizens,
wherever they may be, as an unquestionable
priority for our country. Our
foreign policy decisions will be based on
this need. He will also protect the interests
of our business community abroad.
It should be clear to all that we will respond
to any aggressive acts committed
against us” (Crosston 2018, 145).
This narrative was tapped
again for the intervention in Crimea
and Eastern Ukraine. Putin and his
supporting constituents felt justified
in their actions to “liberate”
and “defend” parts of the historically
held “motherland” where millions of
ethnic Russians were living. The new
narrative is very similar to the age-old
one in that the specific identities and
cultures of ethnic Russians were not
only being suppressed, but were being
conspiratorially exploited and eroded
by Western interests and manipulations.
The Russian leadership determined that
the illegitimate, seemingly Western-inspired
“color revolutions” needed to be
counterbalanced by securing the exceptional
Russian identity and image. Putin
wanted to be portrayed as a protector of
“his” people; whether those people were
actually within Russia’s physical borders
did not matter. The Russian people
and defense apparatus wanted to contradict
an ever-looming and newly reinforced
paranoia and theme, ensuring
that the West did not possess unilateral,
unchecked power that directly contradicted
Russian society’s enduring conservative
values and paternal preferences.
In 2014, Putin solidified his opinion
and the “us versus them” theme, stating,
“the crisis in Ukraine, which was provoked
and masterminded by some of
our Western partners in the first place,
is now being used to revive NATO. We
clearly need to take all of this into consideration
in planning and deciding
how to guarantee our country’s security”
(Sochor 2018, 47).
During Syria’s current civil war,
Putin and his constructed apparatus of
influence have advanced a step further.
Not only have they defended their interactions
with the same tonality and
justifications used by the West in its
Middle East excursions, but they have
also attacked and embarrassed the West
for setting the conditions for disaster
and failing to take proper actions to
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