Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 84

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
by self-interest. The nation’s (Western)
leaders are also assumed to be highly
capable, but untrustworthy. The enemy
image results when an international
relationship is characterized by intense
competition, comparable compatibility/power,
incomparable cultural status”
(Alexander et al. 2015, 29). After a
series of perceived humiliating actions
by NATO and the West and the encompassing
embarrassment of the failed
experiments of communism and perestroika,
Putin harnessed this collective
and amplified emotion to differentiate
his sphere of influence from the West.
Through constant exploitation and propaganda
reinforcement, Putin’s calculatingly
framed enemy image is singled
out for maturation among the Russian
masses. With this operationalization,
the West “is perceived as relatively
equal in capability and culture. In its
most extreme form, the diabolical enemy
is seen as irrevocably aggressive in
motivation, monolithic in decisional
structure, and highly rational in decision-making”
(Cottam et al. 2010, 54).
Early on as president, Putin stated
to the Russian Federal Assembly that
“above all else Russia was, is and will,
of course, be a major European power”
(Feklyunina 2008, 609). However, due
to NATO’s encroachment and failure
to fully incorporate the new Russia into
the Western system, Putin shifted this
well-intended perception and imagery,
stating, “Russia has always perceived
herself as a Eurasian country. We have
never forgotten [that] the main part
of Russian land is in Asia” (Feklyunina
2008, 609). This manipulation and
shifting of imagery allowed the leader
to be, at times, centrist in his direction
and intentions. This calculated vagueness
provides “something for everyone”;
it facilitates the motivations and
the desires of many business elites who
desire to integrate with the established
West. At the same time, it cleverly allows
Russia to have its own identity.
The average citizen is thus entitled to
feel proud, unique, and established despite
enduring the collective failures of
communism, the unfulfilled promise
of post-Soviet Union reforms, and the
perceived Western onslaught of mental
and physical encroachment.
The current Russian government
and societal psyche embrace “global affairs
as being the exclusive, realist domain
of Hobbes and Machiavelli; life
is brutish and nasty. In sum, the preservation
of power it is not moral or
immoral but rather amoral since the
pursuit is simply about capability and
effective strategy” (Crosston 2008, 103).
The Russian military ventures into
Chechnya, Syria, Georgia, and Eastern
Ukraine prove Putin’s appeal through
Realpolitik actions and frames of reference.
Conscientiously framed military
actions now ensure that the Russian
nation is viewed as not only powerful,
but also as invoking its right to self-defense.
In Chechnya, Putin has used the
same patriotic language and themes to
defend the homeland that the West has
invoked in its seemingly never-ending
“war on terrorism.” Putin passionately
stated in a personal interview:
we will destroy those who resort
to arms. And we will have
to create a local elite, which understands
that it is in Chechnya’s
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