Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 83

A New Russian Realpolitik: Putin’s Operationalization of Psychology and Propaganda
and his government apparatus to solidify
power, achieve critical international
and domestic political objectives, and,
when required, to begin to erode the
unified Western coalition. With these
efforts, “Russia’s strategy of influence
seeks to alter the perception of—if not
halt and eventually reverse—Central
and Eastern Europe’s Euro-Atlantic enlargement
and orientation, which has
the added benefits of breaking U.S. and
Western dominance of the international
and democratic liberal order, restoring
Russia’s historic sphere of influence,
and returning to a bipolar organized
world” (Conley et al. 2016).
The Russian masses credited
Putin’s policies and achievements with
their newly restored sense of legitimacy,
self-respect, and international
importance. To date, the Russian population
seems more than willing to endure
a new paternalism well above that
of Western standards to fill the void of
security and collectivism left over from
a perceived crusade of humiliation by
the US and its Western allies. Many
think that Putin exhumed “the type of
Russian state that older citizens want,
and the citizenry would likely allow
anything other than an autocratic state
in which citizens are relieved of the
responsibility for politics ... and imaginary
foreign enemies are invoked to
forge an artificial unity” (Charles River
Editors 2014).
For over a decade, the former
Soviet spy-turned-politician addressed
past Russian political blunders that
negatively resonated in the developed
Russian psyche. By successfully combining
constructivist realities and Realpolitik
actions as a counterbalance
against historical humiliators, Putin
empowered a Russian population to
regain their self-esteem and direction.
However, if Putin exposes his nation’s
possible economic or military weaknesses,
like Gorbachev and Yeltsin did,
he may be disregarded and cast to the
footnotes of Russian history.
Putin’s Successful
Image Utilization
Utilizing the work of Alexander
et al. (2105), this study advances
the notion in which “image
theorists suggest that the ideas about
other actors in the world affairs are organized
into group schemas, or images,
with well-defined cognitive elements
... comprised of cognitions and beliefs
regarding the target nation’s motives,
leadership, and primary characteristics”
(28). The Russian leadership’s
ability to frame specific perceptions of
in-groups and out-groups has allowed
it to consolidate power and depict the
West as culturally and structurally inferior.
The newly reinforced image it portrays
to both in-groups and out-groups
enables the emergence of a perceived
equally credible Russian alternative to
the once dominant Western values and
institutions.
Putin has determined that an
“enemy image” is the primary perception
to be exploited, constructed, and
advanced. “With enemy image, one
considers the other nation (the West)
as evil, opportunistic, and motivated
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