Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 5, Number 1, Spring / Summer 2020 | Page 49

Psychology as a Warfighting Domain
ing an understanding of the internet
and of the threat of state actors, while
overfamiliarity of the internet leads
to younger generations’ vulnerability.
With younger adults growing up in
a culture where information is readily
available through Google searches and
anyone online can appear to be an expert,
it can be challenging to convince
younger adults to analyze articles and
their sources (Conger 2019). This manipulation
of the American public has
not ceased and combating the spread of
misinformation and disinformation is
one of the current struggles the influence
operations community is facing
today. It is crucial for the United States
to find ways to counter disinformation
in order to retain its status as a world
power.
Information Warfare Today
The United States continues to
explore how to shape the behaviors
of decision-makers,
from working to enhance a friendly
nation’s perception of the US, through
strategic communication, to influencing
adversaries either to avoid conflict
or enhance ongoing war efforts. Modern
advancements in technology and
psychological theory have enabled nation-states
to reach individuals in ways
previously considered unimaginable.
The fiscal cost once associated with creating
and spreading information and
disinformation is no longer as much of
a consideration. As history shows, the
IO arena and the ability to influence
an individual’s cognitive and implicit
processes have only become more subversive
and easier to produce. However,
there are some obstacles preventing the
United States from being as successful
with messaging and countering disinformation
as other countries.
The ease and impact of modern
psychological operations have made
their use extremely appealing to a multitude
of nations. For example, Russia
has worked diligently to unify its operations
for the purposes of external
influence. China has taken a different
approach, leveraging introspective
campaigns against its own citizens.
North Korea has also embraced the
psychological approach, sans technology,
using cultural factors to influence
its population (Matherly 2019). As
the capabilities of these nations grow
stronger, the United States lags further
behind. Disjointed and poorly defined
operations often create power vacuums
or oversaturate the information environment,
leading to mixed messaging
and weak campaigns. The results are
ineffective and create messaging that
lacks the influence intended.
The United States is at risk of
critically falling behind near-peer adversaries
in the realm of IO. In a military
system conceptualized around
warfighting domains, the time has
come to designate a new warfighting
domain: the psychological domain. Doing
so would allow the US to leverage
capabilities like those of US adversaries.
Leaders do not need to look far because
pockets of excellence already exist
within the DOD. These include US
Army PSYOP command, the Marine
Corps Information Operations Com-
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