Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 33

Anonymous Versus ISIS: The Role of Non-state Actors in Self-defense
combined with surveillance technology provided by Los Zetas’ stable of government,
law enforcement, and military co-optees and collaborators, enabled the group to counter
the threat presented by Anonymous. Known for its ruthlessness, the cartel responded by
carrying out actions that would ensure the Anonymous threat would not present itself
ever again. The hacktivists backed down because to follow through with their actions
was not worth the potential cost in lives. Singer and Friedman (118-126) suggest that
this particular incident make us think about cyber-war theory, especially the limits of
state actors in dampening or preventing such conflict from escalating. Rexton Kan (41-
43) adds that cyber conflict presents a paradigm within the cyber-world and without the
state. Both authors express concern about the evolving iteration of nontraditional actors
in this far more asymmetric twenty-first century.
For example, in 2007, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) put together
a team of “hired hackers” and conducted an experiment to destroy a large generator
via cyber-attack (East et al 2009, 67–81). Four years later, the experiment, known as
the “Aurora Generator Test”, was declassified and the impressive video footage released,
showing how a cyber-attack could destroy a large diesel generator that was linked to a
mock electricity grid. The attack, using a computer program to modify circuit breakers,
was enough to see the generator self-destruct. Might the oil infrastructure that ISIS
controls be vulnerable to such attacks—covert sabotage? And if the state, or state actors,
for whatever reason be unable or unwilling to carry such activity, then might the likes of
Anonymous be prepared to “step up to the plate?”
In early February 2015, a Five-Country Ministerial Communique was released
after a meeting of top government ministers from the “Five-Eyes” nations of the United
States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Five-Country Ministerial
Communiqué 2015). The single emphasis of the Communique concerned the shared
efforts necessary to counter the threat from violent extremism. Ministers identified the
need to develop proactive strategies to address these groups and their “use of . . . internet
and social media platforms” and stressed the importance of a “sustained and aggressive
approach” to counter such challenges. 2 The Ministers suggested that opportunities to
work with commercial companies might achieve this end. Could we add other non-state
actors to this new twenty-first century coalition?
History tells us that engagement like this has been done in the past and, in all
likelihood, continues today. During the 1980s, as computers started to form connected
networks, accessing such networks via clandestine means gave intelligence services
an opportunity for further methods of penetration. An early example was the KGBsponsored
German hackers who penetrated several hundred computer systems
connected to the U.S. Military’s MILNET networks (Price 2014, 55). And it seems that
state actors recruiting third-party experts or specialists in order to access, deny, and
disrupt adversaries and national security threats have not changed. Investigations into
the FBI’s use of one of Anonymous’ very own—Hector “Sabu” Monsegur, ultimately
discovered that this informant and third-party hacker who had been working for the
government since his arrest in 2011 was responsible for coordinating several hundred
computer attacks and penetrations against Anonymous members themselves, as well
2
Five-Country Ministerial Communiqué, released February 6, 2015.
27