Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 34

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
as websites operated by the governments of Iran, Syria, Brazil, and Pakistan (Mazzetti
2014). 3 In an opinion piece in ForeignPolicy.com in early March 2015, commentator
Emerson Brooking (2015) suggested that the very people who should be charged with
countering ISIS, “dispersed, rapidly regenerative online presence,” should be digital
natives themselves. Brooking considered that Anonymous was perfect for the job, and
should be supported with resources to do so, including paying those individuals with the
online currency “Bitcoin.” He added “As a rule, hacktivists despise bullying, hypocrisy,
and fundamentalism. The Islamic State couldn’t present a clearer target.” The prevailing
concern is the means by which non-state actors such as Anonymous might be co-opted
into serving national and international interests to do what state actors cannot or would
not do. Coercion or monetary incentives are probably to go against the social tenets that
Anonymous’ member espouse and may have serious future sustainability consequences
for the group. In an interview with a member of the Anonymous collective known as
“Nix,” who also provides legal support for those being prosecuted for hacking, the authors
were told that “one of the main attractions to being a part of Anonymous is a sense
of empowerment to right wrongs.” 4 Having turncoats or hired guns greatly diminishes
this sense of shared social activism. If we return to Anonymous’ first principles, it is
their unrelenting moral stance on issues and rights and its ability to disclose massive
amounts of information on associations and activities that has propagated its renown.
Thus, Nix added “In response to Anonymous’ disclosures that directly benefit society,
perhaps a Cyber Samaritan Law would benefit a nation state’s efforts to limit wrongful
prosecutions” (2015). Such a law would limit an activist’s liability; allow government
deniability; conserve judicial resources; and provide better targeted prosecutions. Could
state actors embrace such a direction?
Conclusions
In his article, Brooking (2015) mentions that engaging in such activity, or sanctioning
the recruitment of hacktivists like Anonymous, would challenge what we would
consider to be the “international norms.” But things have changed. Surely these rules
are not necessarily applicable in the non-state actor realm? Can we embark on a new set
of rules that takes us back before Westphalia, to the days when Indian strategic thinker
Kautilya first introduced the “Mandala theory” of state security—“the enemy of my
enemy is my friend”(Rangarajan 1992)? Rexton Kan concludes that the Anonymous
versus Los Zetas “stand-off ” was not anticipated and suggests that cyber-conflict and
the future of cyber-warfare is only limited by the human imagination. At some stage,
he adds, it is likely to transition from online embarrassment and discomfort, to off-line
and real—death and destruction. Clearly should such novel methods be utilized by nonstate
actors, they must be met with equally creative policies and strategies from security
agencies.
3
Monsegur had been partly responsible for the penetration and theft of information belonging to
the Texas-based Stratfor Global Intelligence provider. Interestingly, neither Monsegur, nor any of the
Anonymous felons was charged with cyber-attacks on any of these foreign websites.
4
Nix interview conducted with authors on April 12, 2015.
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