Global Security and Intelligence Studies Volume 2, Issue 1, Fall 2016 | Page 32

Global Security and Intelligence Studies
the “hacktivists” knew were in collusion with the Los Zetas narco-traffickers. Following
the murder of an internet blogger by Los Zetas in another Mexican state, Anonymous
launched a DDOS attack against websites linked to the state government of Veracruz
in protest of the “soft-response” from local officials, but also threatened to publish a
vast archive of emails detailing the corrupt relationships between the cartel and various
network partners online. In response, Los Zetas hired cyber-experts to help “reverse
hack” Anonymous in order to identify some of its members. One such hacktivist was
ultimately identified, kidnapped, and threatened with execution. This real Mexican
“stand-off ” was resolved when Anonymous agreed not to release the material, and in
exchange, the kidnap victim was freed with an accompanying warning from Los Zetas
that they would kill 10 people for every name Anonymous should subsequently chose
to publicize (Singer and Friedman, 84–86 and Rexton Kan 2013, 40). Paul Rexton
Kan, who wrote extensively of the exchange, described the stalemate as one of “. . . two
clandestine non-state groups [who] stared each other down in the digital domain” (40).
More importantly, he highlights the different benefits and values non-state actors see in
the Internet and the information age:
The members of Anonymous see cyberspace as a type of commons that should be
accessible to all…. Los Zetas, on the other hand, do not view cyberspace through an
ideological lens but through an operational lens
With the Anonymous–Los Zetas “stand-off ” firmly in mind, we turn to the
question of how vulnerable might Anonymous see itself—real or perceived—because
of ISIS’ very existence? Anonymous has a number of options that it might use in a
nonviolent or nonkinetic manner, in order to defend the Anonymous “state”. Anonymous
published a “Declaration of War” because ISIS strikes at the very heart of what those in
Anonymous believe in; that of freedom of expression and freedom of speech (Makuch
2014 and Chen 2014). While the conflict continues to progress and evolve, perhaps the
real issues to be considered are as follows:
• Can Anonymous maintain this nonviolent approach (denial of service,
release of information, etc.) and how far could they go?
• How effective could Anonymous be and is this the way forward?
• Should states embrace such action from nonviolent non-state actors,
encourage such activity even, or is it opening up a “Pandora’s box” of
interpretations, debates on thresholds?
• What constitutes an “enemy,” control of resources, or are we far too early
into this “battle in the cyber domain” construct for us to get anywhere
near beginning to understand what we are dealing with now?
Escalation Options: How Far Can Anonymous Go?
Largely as a result of the incident with Anonymous, Los Zetas embarked on a greater
effort to increase their cyber capabilities by recruiting and coercing computer
engineers and university students to assist with their cyber-crime efforts. This,
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