530
Interpreting and Preserving the Constitution
the laws or Constitution of the State, but according to the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States, ‘‘the supreme law of the land.’’ . . . .
It must, therefore, be conceded that the Constitution not only contemplated, but meant to provide for cases within the scope of the judicial
power of the United States, which might yet depend before State tribunals. It was foreseen that in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction,
State courts would incidentally take cognizance of cases arising under
the Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States. Yet to all these
cases the judicial power, by the very terms of the Constitution, is to extend.
It cannot extend by original jurisdiction if that was already rightfully and
exclusively attached in the State courts, which (as has been already shown)
may occur; it must therefore extend by appellate jurisdiction, or not at all.
It would seem to follow that the appellate power of the United States
must, in such cases, extend to State tribunals; and if in such cases, there
is no reason why it should not equally attach upon all others within the
purview of the Constitution.
It has been argued that such an appellate jurisdiction over State courts
is inconsistent with the genius of our governments, and the spirit of the
Constitution. That the latter was never designed to act upon State sovereignties, but only upon the people, and that, if the power exists, it will
materially impair the sovereignty of the States, and the independence of
their courts. We cannot yield to the force of this reasoning; it assumes
principles which we cannot admit, and draws conclusions to which we
do not yield our assent.
It is a mistake that the Constitution was not designed to operate upon
States, in their corporate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which
restrain or annul the sovereignty of t