Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
531
well as in some other cases, Congress have a right to revise, amend, or
supersede the laws which may be passed by State legislatures. When,
therefore, the States are stripped of some of the highest attributes of sovereignty, and the same are given to the United States; when the legislatures of the States are, in some respects, under the control of Congress,
and in every case are, under the Constitution, bound by the paramount
authority of the United States, it is certainly difficult to support the argument that the appellate power over the decisions of State courts is contrary to the genius of our institutions. The courts of the United States can,
without question, revise the proceedings of the executive and legislative
authorities of the States, and if they are found to be contrary to the Constitution, may declare them to be of no legal validity. Surely, the exercise
of the same right over judicial tribunals is not a higher or more dangerous act of sovereign power.
Nor can such a right be deemed to impair the independence of State
judges. It is assuming the very ground in controversy to assert that they
possess an absolute independence of the United States. In respect to the
powers granted to the United States, they are not independent; they are
expressly bound to obedience by the letter of the Constitution; and if they
should unintentionally transcend their authority, or misconstrue the Constitution, there is no more reason for giving their judgments an absolute
and irresistible force, than for giving it to the acts of the other coordinate
departments of State sovereignty.
The argument urged from the possibility of the abuse of the revising
power, is equally unsatisfactory. It is always a doubtful course, to argue
against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its abuse.
It is still more difficult, by such an argument, to engraft upon a general
power, a restriction which is not to be found in the terms in which it is
given. From the very nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in
the last resort, must rest somewhere—wherever it may be vested it is
susceptible of abuse. In all questions of jurisdiction the inferior or appellate court must pronounce the final judgment; and common-sense, as
well as legal reasoning, has conferred it upon the latter. . . .
This is not all. A motive of another kind, perfectly compatible with the
most sincere respect for State tribunals, might induce the grant of appellate power over their decisions. That motive is the importance, and even