Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee
529
Supreme Court in all cases where it has not original jurisdiction, subject,
however, to such exceptions and regulations as Congress may prescribe.
It is, therefore, capable of embracing every case enumerated in the Constitution, which is not exclusively to be decided by way of original jurisdiction. But the exercise of appellate jurisdiction is far from being limited
by the terms of the Constitution, to the Supreme Court. There can be no
doubt that Congress may create a succession of inferior tribunals, in each
of which it may vest appellate as well as original jurisdiction. . . .
As, then, by the terms of the Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction is
not limited as to the Supreme Court, and as to this court it may be exercised in all other cases than those of which it has original cognizance, what
is there to restrain its exercise over State tribunals in the enumerated cases?
The appellate power is not limited by the terms of the third article to any
particular courts. The words are, ‘‘the judicial power (which includes appellate power) shall extend to all cases,’’ &c., and ‘‘in all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.’’ It
is the case, then, and not the court, that gives the jurisdiction. If the judicial power extends to the case, it will be in vain to search in the letter of
the Constitution for any qualification as to the tribunal where it depends.
It is incumbent, then, upon those who assert such a qualification to show
its existence by necessary implication. If the text be clear and distinct, no
restriction upon its plain and obvious import ought to be admitted, unless the inference be irresistible. . . .
But it is plain that the framers of the Constitution did contemplate that
cases within the judicial cognizance of the United States not only might
but would arise in the State courts, in the exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction. With this view the sixth article declares, that ‘‘this Constitution,
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution, or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’’ It is obvious,
that this obligation is imperative upon the State judges in their official,
and not merely in their private, capacities. From the very nature of their
judicial duties they would be called upon to pronounce the law applicable to the case in judgment. They were not to decide merely according to