CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 8

PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON: GOVERNANCE AND VIOLENCE
Briefly, committees promoted factional infighting and supported patron-
client politics, causing Palestinian disunity. As Knudsen observed during his
field research in the camps in 2003, “Both among the secular and Islamist
lobbies we find a plethora of smaller and larger groups, often with
conflicting views and sometimes involved in fratricidal battles that weaken
the refugee community and ultimately undermine their quest for political
hegemony. None of them are able to speak on behalf of the whole refugee
community and this serves to “compartmentalize” and therefore weaken the
Palestinian national struggle to regain their homeland”. 10
During the last few years, little has changed in Palestinian refugee
camps in Lebanon. Today, Ayn al-Hilweh has two popular committees and
two security committees, which represent the camp's 70,000 actual
residents. 11 Recently, a new layer of governance was created - a “follow-up
committee” composed of representatives from all the camp factions, both
secular and Islamist. Yet, there is still a lack of a political reference - a
unified Palestinian position in the camps.
In 2007, the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp was destroyed in a 15-week
battle between a militant Islamist group, Fatah al-Islam, and the Lebanese
Army. The focus group participants warned that unless Palestinians in
Lebanon are permitted to strengthen their own political and security
authorities, they will not be able to prevent a similar outbreak of violence.
One of Nahr al-Bared residents argues, “There has to be a higher council …
to represent the Palestinian people as a whole, especially in the diaspora
camps in Lebanon such as Nahr al-Bared, Ayn al-Hilweh, and Beddawi,
because we are no longer sure that the developments of Nahr al-Bared could
not happen elsewhere”. Another resident agreed, stating, “If the Lebanese
state had permitted politicians or the PLO leadership to form a Palestinian
security force, Fatah al-Islam would never have gained a foothold in the
camp”. 12
Indeed, in the months leading up to the conflict in Nahr al-Bared
(December 2006 to March 2007), the residents of the camp tried repeatedly
to remove Fatah al-Islam members from their camp. To this end, the PLO
engaged in armed clashes with the militants in March. 13 However, the
outcome of these clashes was inconclusive and was dismissed by the
Lebanese authorities as merely “routine” Palestinian infighting, in spite of
the fact that Fatah al-Islam was largely comprised of non- Palestinians. 14 The
10
Are Knudsen, “Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,” Journal of
Refugee Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2, (2005): 216-34.
11
According to the UNRWA, officially, number of residents is 47,500.
12
Sari Hanafi and Sheikh I.Hassan, “Constructing and Governing Nahr al-Bared Camp. An
“Ideal” Model of Exclusion,” Majallat al-Dirasat al-Falastiniyya, No. 78, (2009): 40.
13
Samet Abboud, “The Siege of Nahr al-Bared and the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon,”
Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No 1-2 (2009): 31-48.
14
According to the Lebanese Judiciary Council, Fatah al-Islam was composed of 69 Lebanese
nationals, approximately 50 Palestinians (43 from Syria), 43 Saudis, 12 Syrians, one Tunisian,
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