CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 9

LILIT HARUTUNYAN
security committee of Nahr al-Bared and the PLO lacked both the resources
and the mandate to deal with Fatah al-Islam on their own. The popular
committees lacked resources, which prevented them from fulfilling their
municipal functions. Moreover, the committees lacked skilled technicians
with expertise on urban regulations, water, sanitation and electricity.
There is a tapestry of multiple sovereignties, which include “real
sovereigns”, such as the Lebanese government, but also “phantom
sovereigns”, such as the PLO and other factions, as well as the UNRWA and
other humanitarian agencies, which also contribute to the “state of
exception” and participate in the suspension of the law through various
emergency measures. These measures are contradictory. Rather than creating
order in the camp, they leave it in a state of chaos. Each government-actor,
faction or agency must compete, not for the allegiance of each Palestinian
resident, but instead for control over each refugee. “Contrary to our modern
habit of representing the political realm in terms of citizens’ rights, free will,
and social contracts, from the point of view of sovereignty, only bare life is
authentically political”, suggests Giorgio Agamben. 15
Among the refugees, there is conviction that the popular committees
and the factions, in their current form, do not represent the interests of
Palestinians in Lebanon.
Political disenchantment in the camps
The focus groups testified to a low degree of political activity among
the youth in the camps. Out of eighteen people, only three had engaged in
political activities in recent years. This differs significantly from the
situation in the past, when most people participated in a variety of political
activities. Among those in the youth focus group, some were busy securing
life’s necessities, while others appeared weary of politics and disinclined to
join political factions. The only exceptions are the Hamas supporters, who
are quite active both in the Nahr al-Bared and Beddawi camps. One of the
indicators of the strength of each faction can be inferred from the results of
the election of the UNRWA Staff Union. In the election of April 2009,
Hamas won the majority of seats in the north of the country, while Fatah 16
won in Beirut and in the south.
The consequences of the disillusionment are very important for the
long-term relationship between the youth and their community and society,
as well as for social cohesion within the community. The tendency to favor
migration is another indicator of this political disillusionment. According to
one Algerian, one Yemeni and one Iraqi. See Hanafi and Hassan, “Constructing and
Governing Nahr al-Bared Camp. An “Ideal” Model of Exclusion,” 39-52.
15
Agamben, Homo Sacer, 106.
16
Fatah (Arabic: acronym of Harakat al Tahrir al Falastini, Movement for Liberation of
Palestine). It was founded in 1958 by Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf and Khalil Wazir in
Kuwait.
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