CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 7

LILIT HARUTUNYAN
struggle. This situation changed after 1982, when the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO) military bodies had to leave Lebanon and move to
Tunisia. 7 After the forced departure of the PLO headquarters and leadership
from Lebanon, the PLO’s “popular committees” and security committees
were dismantled (except in the camps in the south) and were replaced by
committees that were weaker and largely pro-Syrian. The new committees
lacked legitimacy because their members were not elected as before, nor
were they recognized by the Lebanese authorities. The camp residents
instead resorted to traditional power brokers such as imams, local notables
(wujaha) and local security leaders to resolve quarrels and disagreements
before turning to the police. While such informal conflict resolution methods
were mostly successful in the past, the refugee camps are no longer
communitarian and headed by local notables. This is mainly because of
urbanization and migration. The continual transformation of power-sharing
within the camps is critical, especially after the departure of the PLO in
1982.
The current situation of the refugee camps in Lebanon has
demonstrated a fundamental crisis of governance in the camps 8 , which
suffers from the presence of dozens of competing factions fighting for power
and influence. The committees are comprised of representatives from each
faction who are appointed, while those not elected yet are expected to keep
the peace, solve internal disputes, provide security, interact with the
Lebanese government and aid agencies, and administer the camp in
coordination with UNRWA. 9 In some camps, such as Ayn al-Hilweh, an
additional education council was established, composed of representatives
from all factions as well as local religious authorities. However, although
there were very rare cooperation and coordination between the many popular
committees, some focus group participants complained that these
committees largely did not agree on important issues nor coordinate their
activities, did not enjoy popular legitimacy and were not recognized by the
Lebanese government. The committees were neither able to protect their
constituents from harassment by the Lebanese security forces controlling the
camp perimeters nor hold UNRWA accountable for its shortcomings.
7
Julie Peteet, “Socio-Political Integration and Conflict Resolution in the Palestinian Camps in
Lebanon”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, (1987): 29-44.
8
Sari Hanafi, “Governance of the Palestinian Refugee Camps in the Arab East
Governmentalities in Quest of Legitimacy”, working paper, Issam Fares Institute for Public
and International Affairs, AUB, (2010).
9
The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) also maintains i ts own administrative apparatus in the camps. The highest-
ranked UNRWA official wields significant power. In at least one of the focus groups, this
official referred to himself as “director of the camp” (“mudir al-mukhayim”). UNRWA
typically appoints members of the new educated elite to leadership positions, such as
engineers, teachers, and pharmacists, many of whom have a history of political activism and
enjoy good relations with the camp residents.
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