CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 56

CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: WHAT IS BISHKEK’S HEDGING STRATAGEM?
substantial security dependency on Moscow. This has become evident in
view of (a) information-sharing platforms and joint military exercises that
have enabled the Kremlin to identify regional vulnerabilities vis-à-vis its
subordinates to make them more docile; (b) the establishment of military
bases to conduct clandestine operations, sabotage actions and hybrid tactics,
as well as (c) the potential to launch cyber attacks and information warfare in
case of dominant-subordinate discord. 43
(2) Running parallel, the SCO, founded in 2001, is committed to
expanding military cooperation, despite the fact that it also involves cultural
activities and economic coordination. Similar to the CSTO, it aims to resolve
regional security issues that require the harmonisation of common security
preferences and interests within a multilateral institutional framework under
the informal leadership of Russia and China as regional dominants. 44 In
terms of solidifying regional security order, which has been severely
threatened by the “three evils”, the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure
(RATS) was adopted in 2002. This measure involves the encouragement of
information sharing, provisions of advice and proposals on combatting
terrorist forces, training of personnel, the maintenance of contacts with other
international organisations related to containing terrorism, as well as
conducting joint actions. However, it has to be emphasised that the SCO
does not function as a military alliance. 45
Recognising these implications, China and Russia, as dominant states,
have been concerned about the volatile frontiers in Central Asia, especially
in Kyrgyzstan due to the highly unstable political environment following the
Tulip Revolution stemming from ethnic clashes and terrorist threats.
Particularly Beijing has reiterated and increased its bilateral ties with
Bishkek by enhancing the latter’s military capabilities within the cooperative
framework of the SCO. This primarily involved the modernisation of
Kyrgyzstan’s intelligence service and armed forces as well as numerous bi-
and multilateral military exercises. China considers this engagement vital for
43
Arman Kaliyev, “Why is Russia Building up Its Military Presence in Central Asia”,
Caravanserai, May 11, 2018, http://central.asia-
news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2018/05/11/feature-01, (accessed June 23, 2018).
44
Stephen Aris, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A
Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or Anti-Western Bloc?”, 460-461; Susan
Turner, “Russia, China, and the Multipolar World Order: The Danger in the Undefined”,
Asian Perspective, Vol. 33, No. 1 (2009): 159-184, here 174-176; Charles E. Ziegler, “Central
Asia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and American Foreign Policy From
Indifference to Engagement”, 497; Peter Ferdinand, “Sino-Russian Relations: An Analytical
Overview”, in Russia-China Relations: Current Stage, Alternative Futures, and Implications
for the West, Finish Institute of International Affairs Report, Arkady Moshes and Matti
Nojonen, No. 30 (Helsinki, September 2011): 22-37, here 27.
45
Marc Lanteigne, “'In Medias Res': The Development of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation as Security Community”, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4 (2006/2007): 605-622,
here 606-609, 615; Zhao Huasheng, “China's View of and Expectations from the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation”, Asian Survey, Vol. 53, No. 3 (2013): 436-460, here 440.
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