CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 55

MAXIMILIAN OHLE, RICHARD J. COOK, ZHAOYING HAN & RYSBEK MAMAZHANOV
regional security developments, as the Tulip Revolution in 2005, one of the
so-called Colour Revolutions, caused the ousting of the pro-Russian Akayev
regime as the consequence of election rigging, necessitating the restoration
of political order. As opposed to the Colour Revolutions in Georgia and
Ukraine, there was essentially no anti-Russian sentiment, enabling Moscow
to mediate between the conflicting actors. In the aftermath, Akayev was
granted asylum in Russia, whilst Bakiyev took over governmental
responsibilities. 38 In April 2010, however, the Bakiyev administration was
similarly overthrown, contributing to subsequent ethnic clashes between the
Kyrgyz and Uzbeks that revealed the need for governmental consolidation. 39
Thereupon, the CSTO has recognised that the Colour Revolutions and
similar events constitute a substantial threat to the post-Soviet regional order
in Central Asia. It was estimated that such events might have spilled over,
amplifying the detrimental impact on regime legitimacy. Subsequently,
Russia had mobilised its subordinates to suppress any uprisings aimed at
disturbing the political order provided. It was assumed that the West was
allegedly supporting such movements, so that the military bases established
by the West in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan had to be shut down in July 2005
following the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijon Massacre in
Uzbekistan. 40
Analogously, Bishkek is keenly aware of Russia’s tremendous
commitment to regional security and the preservation of Eurasian
authoritarianism, acknowledging the authority conferment upon the Kremlin
to resolve relevant security challenges within the framework of the CSTO. 41
Expounding upon this, distinct characteristics of dominant-subordinate
bargaining are identifiable. In exchange for granting the Kremlin the ability
to establish military bases and despatch Russian troops on its soil,
Kyrgyzstan receives an annual financial dividend and military equipment as
compensation, which has been subject to renegotiation within either bilateral
or multilateral-institutional contexts. 42
Ergo, the CSTO functions as a foreign policy instrument of the
Kremlin to reassert its leverage over post-Soviet subordinates, leading to a
38
Stobdan, Central Asia. Democracy, Instability and Strategic Game in Kyrgyzstan, 2-7.
Ibid., 9, 20.
40
Ibid., 14.
41
Alexander Lukin, “What the Kremlin is Thinking: Putin's Vision for Eurasia”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 4 (July/August 2014): 85-93, here 91; Alexandros Petersen and Katinka
Barysch, “Russia, China, and the Geopolitics of Energy in Central Asia”, Centre for European
Reform (2011), 34; Andrew Monaghan, “'An Enemy at the Gates' or 'From Victory to
Victory': Russian Foreign Policy”, International Affairs (Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1944-), Vol. 84, No. 4 (July 2008): 717-733, here 719, 727; Lilia Shevtsova, “Post-
Communist Russia: A Historical Opportunity Missed”, International Affairs (Royal Institute
of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 83, No. 5 (September 2007), 891-912, here 900; Joseph
Cheng, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: China's Initiative in Regional Institution
Building”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 41, No. 4 (November 2011): 632-656.
42
Stobdan, Central Asia. Democracy, Instability and Strategic Game in Kyrgyzstan, 148, 175.
39
55