CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 32

DIMINISHING INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY OF TURKISH ARMED FORCES …
competition among the existing groups. 40 In his interviews, Turkish analyst
N. Ali Özcan pointed out that military appointments and promotions
carried out by the civilian government pursue political objectives, so that
the ruling party can increase control that will lead to the politicization of
the army. 41 A researcher of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
S. Çağaptay, believes that as a result of the military coup failure,
President Erdoğan was able to complete his takeover of the army and the
police by turning them into so-called “pro-Erdoğan” in the context of
Turkey's socio-political polarization. Moreover, according to him, in the
future, political intervention by the army will not be directed to
overthrow Erdoğan, but to protect him. 42 According to Turkish
researchers G. Tol and O. Taşpınar, Erdoğan's plan for the influence of
conservative values and the inclusion of Islam in the army and the loyal
elements invested by the current authorities in the army structures, may
politicize the army officer ranks and contribute to a decline in the
professionalism of the army. In addition to this, Erdoğan's primary goal is
to establish loyalty and full control over the army, which is already
underway. 43 Besides politicization trends within the military, it is obvious
that politicization affects the institutional identity of the TAF, leading to
further ideological transformation.
Institutional and legislative mechanisms for the weakening of the
role of the army and socio-political processes undoubtedly pave the way
for a change of the collective identity and value-system of the army.
However, over the past decade, due to formal and informal influences,
the army has found itself in the domain of institutional transformation,
value and ideological imposition of the current authorities. Despite the
reforms in the civil-military relationships in Turkey, where the center of
gravity is tilting towards the civilian authorities, it does not imply civilian
and democratic oversight of the army, as they do not ensure the involvement
of state and civil institutes in civilian control mechanisms. In this case, a
monopoly of control over the army taking place, where exclusive jurisdiction
is given to the president's institution. With the constitutional amendments of
40
Lars Haugom, “The Turkish Armed Forces Restructured”, The Turkey Analyst, September
30, 2016, https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/566-the-
turkish-armed-forces-restructured.html (accessed October 15, 2016).
41
Nihat Ali Özcan, “Post-coup attempt restructuring means Turkish army may no longer be
functional”, interview by B. Yinanc, Hurriyet Daily News,
November 7, 2016,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/post-coup-attempt-restructuring-means-turkish-army-may-
no-longer-be-functional-ozcan-105805 (accessed March 15, 2018).
42
Soner Cagaptay, “Erdogan is dividing Turkey against itself”, The Atlantic, March 31, 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/03/turkey-erdogan-kurds-pkk-isis-
syria-coup-gulen/521487/ (accessed May 9, 2017).
43
Gonul Tol and Omer Taspinar, “Erdogan’s Turn to the Kemalists. How it will shape
Turkish
Foreign
Policy”,
Foreign
Affairs,
October
27,
2016,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2016-10-27/erdogans-turn-kemalists accessed
(December 20, 2016).
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