CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 31

LEVON HOVSEPYAN
was to keep Gül away from running in the upcoming presidential elections. 35
For a long time, the media circulated information according to which Gül
could be nominated as a presidential candidate by the “Saadet” party. After
the aforementioned meeting, Gül announced that he would not be running.
In May of the same year, during a pre-election rally in Malatya,
Erdoğan's sharp speech directed at M. Ince, the presidential candidate from
RPP, was applauded by the Commander of the 2nd Army of the Land
Forces, T. Metin. 36 This act by a high-ranking officer became a source of
serious debate in the political field and in the press. The Speaker of the RPP,
B. Tezcan, announced the need to investigate T. Metin, calling on the Chief
of General Staff and the prosecutor's office to challenge. 37 The presidential
candidate, M. Ince, promised to "tear the general strap" after being elected. 38
The General’s behavior was interpreted as interference by the army in the
electoral process and support for the ruling AKP. One of the opposition
newspapers ran the headline, ''The party commander of the army''. 39
The above-mentioned two cases make the tendencies of the Turkish
army's politicization process clear as the army becomes a political
instrument for the authorities. After the July 15 coup attempt, a number of
analyses on the consequences of the reorganization of the TAF began to
raise the issue of establishing political control over the army by the
authorities and the trends and prospects of bringing it into their political-
ideological field. In his observations, Norwegian researcher, L. Haugom,
notices that the government, along with the increasing the civilian control
mechanisms over the TAF, has the objective of establishing political control
upon the latter, as opposed to civilian democratic control, due to the
weakness of the parliamentary mechanisms. Instead, the executive power
and the president assume a serious role in that regard. As a consequence of
this, the Armed Forces will become more politicized, with stronger
35
“Kalın ve Akar'ın Abdullah Gül'ü ziyaretinin perde arkasını CHP'li vekil açıkladı”,
Cumhuriyet, April 27, 2018
http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/siyaset/965386/Kalin_ve_Akar_in_Abdullah_Gul_u_ziy
aretinin_perde_arkasini_CHP_li_vekil_acikladi.html (accessed April 27, 2018).
36
“Komutan dört köşe: Erdoğan, İnce’yi eleştirdikçe Korgeneral Temel alkış tutu”, Diken,
June 2, 2018, http://www.diken.com.tr/komutan-dort-kose-erdogan-inceyi-elestirdikce-
korgeneral-temel-alkis-tuttu/ (accessed June 10, 2018).
37
“CHP'li Tezcan Erdoğan'ı alkışlayan 2. Ordu Komutanı için savcıları göreve çağırdı:
Derhal işlem başlatılmalıdır”, T24, June 4, 2018, http://t24.com.tr/haber/chpli-tezcan-
erdogani-alkislayan-2-ordu-komutani-icin-savcilari-goreve-cagirdi-derhal-islem-
baslatilmalidir,643449 (accessed June 4, 2018).
38
“2. Ordu Komutanı'na ağır sözler: Senin apoletlerini sökmezsem ben de Muharrem İnce
değilim”, HaberTürk, June 2, 2018, http://www.haberturk.com/tv/gundem/haber/1997800-2-
ordu-komutani-na-agir-sozler-senin-apoletlerini-sokmezsem-ben-de-muharrem-ince-degilim
(accessed June 3, 2018).
39
“Partili ordu komutanı!”, Birgün, June 3, 2018, https://www.birgun.net/haber-detay/partili-
ordu-komutani-218197.html (accessed June 4, 2018).
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