CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 120

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA
ceasefi re and emergency meetings between representatives of the con-
fl icting sides neither the Foreign Aff airs and Defense ministries nor the
Minsk Group were able to achieve a concrete solution for peaceful con-
fl ict resolution. Among the major reasons behind the failed mediation
were the continuous hostilities and clashes on the border, Russian weak
state control and the independent functioning of Russian Foreign aff airs
and Defense ministries. 22
1.2. Compromised behavior between Russia
and the West: 1994-1999
Starting from 1994, Russia highlighted its dominant role in the NK
mediation process. As such, it is worth mentioning the Russian eff orts to
establish a ceasefi re and its mediation by solely the Russian representa-
tive. 23 Pavel Grachev fi rstly initiated the discussions on the cessation of
military operations by arranging a meeting with the Armenian (Serzh
Sargsyan) and Azerbaijani (Mamedrafi Mamedov) defense ministers in
Moscow on February 18, 1994. Further, on May 5, 1994, several CIS
and Russian offi cials with the heads of the parliaments of Kyrgyzstan,
NK and Armenia assembled in Bishkek and signed a Protocol that called
for a ceasefi re. The Russian Foreign Aff airs and Defense Ministries put
forward the “fax diplomacy” and collected three separate ceasefi re agree-
ments by fax-machines. As a result, a ceasefi re was established and the
shooting was stopped on May 12 at midnight. 24 Furthermore, aside from
the “fax diplomacy” another important and unusual thing about the cease-
fi re was its establishment without peacekeeping forces. It is explained
with the tense relations between Russia and the West during the initial
stages of the NK confl ict. 25 However, the disagreements between Russia
and the West became less apparent soon after the Budapest Summit in
December 1994. During the Budapest Summit, the conference members
expressed their desire to harmonize their mediation eff orts with Russia. 26
Hence, Russia obtained permanent co-chairmanship in 1995. 27
22
23
24
25
26
27
International Crisis Group. “Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks”. Europe Briefi ng,
issue No.71 (26 September 2013), 4.
Sergey Markedonov, “Gotova li Armeniya priznat Nagorniy Karabax,” (in Russian) [Is Ar-
menia ready to Recognize Nagorno-Karabakh?] Moskovskiy Centr Karnegi, 2016, http://car-
negie.ru/commentary/?fa=63589 (accessed March 3, 2017).
Hakobyan, Karabakh Diary: Green and Black: Neither War nor Peace, 221.
De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War, 238.
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.Budapest Document 1994: Towards A
Genuine Partnership in a New Era, http://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true (ac-
cessed February 16, 2017).
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Mandate of the Co-Chair-
men of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the auspices of the OSCE, 23 March
1995, http://www.osce.org/mg/70125?download=true (accessed March 10, 2017).
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