CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 121

LILIT GALSTYAN
The OSCE Lisbon Summit in December 1996 was another turning
point that increased the attention of the international community towards
the NK confl ict. During the summit, the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group
recommended three principles to settle the confl ict: highest level of self-
rule for NK in Azerbaijan, territorial integrity of both Armenia and Azer-
baijan, and security for Nagorno-Karabakh. Even though all the Minsk
Group members agreed to the proposed principles, Armenia used its veto
power and hindered the establishment of an offi cial ground for further
discussions. Armenia justifi ed its veto by emphasizing that the NK status
should be determined according to the principle of self-determination. 28
Further, in January 1997, France became the next co-chair country,
and during the next month, the United States joined and became the third
co-chair of the Minsk Group. 29 As Boris Yeltsin stated, “It is important
that the parties to the confl ict literally feel the breath on their backs of the
three great powers and understand that there is no other way than rational
proposals to peace and harmony. On our part, we are ready to enhance
cooperation with the US to ensure stability and security in the Caucasus
and the world as a whole.” 30 What is more, during the Denver Summit,
on 20 June 1997, Boris Yeltsin together with the presidents of the US and
France stated, “We express our deep concern over the continuing Na-
gorno-Karabakh confl ict. We are encouraged by the continued observance
of the ceasefi re. However, the ceasefi re by itself is insuffi cient. Without
progress toward a durable settlement, the ceasefi re could break down.
The international community thus has repeatedly called for a settlement;
we believe there should be no delay in establishing a stable and lasting
peace in the region.” 31
Hence, the three major world powers focused on possible ways for the
resolution of the NK confl ict by proposing the “package” 32 (“land-for-sta-
tus”) and “step-by-step” 33 (“land-for-peace”) settlement models. As such,
in July 1997, the Minsk Group presented its “package” approach for the
28
29
30
31
32
33
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Lisbon Document 1996,
http://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true(accessed March 10, 2017).
Volker Jacoby, “The role of the OSCE: an assessment of international mediation eff orts,” in
The limits of leadership. Elites and societies in the Nagorny Karabakh peace process, (Lon-
don: Conciliation Resources, 2005), 32.
Boris Yeltsin, “Boris Yeltsin’s Karabakh Letter to Bill Clinton,” Russia in Global Aff airs, 1997,
http://epress.am/en/2011/01/09/boris-yeltsin%E2%80%99s-karabakh-letter-to-bill-clinton.html
(accessed January 3, 2017).
Joint Statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh confl ict.G7 Information Centre.Denver, 20 June
1997, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/1997denver/nagorno97.html(accessed January 12,
2017).
OSCE Minsk Group. “Comprehensive Agreement on the Resolution of the Nagorno-Kara-
bakh confl ict,” July 1997, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/4b2ddb/pdf/(accessed January 3,
2017).
OSCE Minsk Group. “Agreement on the End of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armed Confl ict,”
December 1997, http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord17_22Keytextsandagreements_2005_
ENG.pdf (accessed January 3, 2017).
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