CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 119

LILIT GALSTYAN
Following it further, when referring to Boris Yeltsin’s administration
it is worth mentioning that inasmuch as, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia had lost its glory and power, Boris Yeltsin was concerned
that Russia would no longer be able to infl uence the economic and polit-
ical processes of its former Soviet Republics. Hence, the regaining of the
Russian “Soviet” power became the fi rst priority for Boris Yeltsin. How-
ever, during the fi rst years of his presidency, Boris Yeltsin did not possess
enough power to make independent decisions. Hence, during the admin-
istration of Boris Yeltsin, Russia was actively engaged in the NK medi-
ation process through two ways: the ministry of foreign aff airs (Andrey
Kozirev (in offi ce from 1990-1996)) and the ministry of defense (Pavel
Grachev (in offi ce from 1992-1996)). 19
Nonetheless, even though the Foreign Aff airs Ministry of Russia was
trying to reach a peaceful settlement to the NK confl ict, its eff orts were
fruitless not only because of the growing violence in the battlefi eld but
also because of the chaotic management of state aff airs. As such, a good
example for the illustration of weak state management was the agreement
made on September 19, in Sochi, between the defense ministers of Ar-
menia (Vazgen Sargsyan) and Azerbaijan (Rahim Gaziev). The two sides
agreed upon a temporary ceasefi re (two months) with the help of Pavel
Grachev (Defense Minister of Russia). However, this time again Russian
eff orts did not produce positive results as Sochi Agreement was a result
of an uncoordinated plan and the Foreign Aff airs Ministry of Russia was
unaware of the agreement. 20
Further, it is worth mentioning that behind the independent actions of
Pavel Grachev and Andrey Kozirev fi rmly stood their personal interests
that were signaling distinct Russian foreign policy approaches. As such,
Andrey Kozirev was in favor of the CSCE involvement in the media-
tion process of the NK struggle. In his turn, Grachev was prioritizing the
Russian role in the NK confl ict resolution. More to that he was support-
ing Armenians in the battlefi eld by the supply of necessary armaments.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as Boris Yeltsin favored balanced relations with
Armenia and Azerbaijan, he wanted to convince the Azerbaijani president
that their military cooperation with Armenia would never be used against
Azerbaijan. 21
Between 1992 to 1994, during the initial stages of the mediation pro-
cess, besides setting deadlines for the establishment of a permanent
19
20
21
Laitin&Suny, “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Karabakh,” 162.
Kazimirov, Peace to Karabakh, 79.
Liz Fuller, “Caucasus/Nagorno-Karabakh: Russia seeks to mollify Baku,” Radio Free Eu-
rope, March 1999, https://reliefweb.int/report/armenia/caucasusnagorno-karabakh-rus-
sia-seeks-mollify-baku (accessed February 16, 2017).
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