CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 118

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA
other intermediaries in the mediation process of the NK confl ict, Mos-
cow fi rstly recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the confl ict. 12 The
presidents of Russia (Boris Yeltsin) and Kazakhstan (Nursultan Nazarba-
yev) made the fi rst attempt of international mediation for the peaceful set-
tlement of the NK confl ict in September 1991. Boris Yeltsin perceived the
confl ict over NK as an excellent opportunity to demonstrate his distinct
foreign policy approach from Gorbachev by getting international and do-
mestic recognition as a triumphant mediator. According to Boris Yeltsin,
Russia had an aim to transform into the guarantor of stability and peace
in its “backyard” (former Soviet Republics). 13 The most disputable issues
discussed in Zheleznovodsk concerned the necessity of ceasefi re, the par-
ticipation of representatives from NK in the process of negotiations and
the status of NK. 14 Even though, initially the Zheleznovodsk negotiations
were believed to bring positive results, the Yeltsin-Nazarbaev mediation
failed on November 20 when an Azerbaijani (MI-8) helicopter containing
22 offi cials was shot down near Nagorno-Karabakh. 15
Further, after the fi rst unsuccessful eff ort to resolve the NK confl ict,
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) became
interested in the issue over Nagorno-Karabakh. During their meeting in
Prague on January 30-31, 1992, it was decided that the Soviet repub-
lics could also be included in the CSCE composition. 16 More to that, on
March 24, 1992, during their Helsinki Additional Meeting, the CSCE
Council decided to have its signifi cant contribution to the peace process
of the NK confl ict. 17 Hence, a decision was made to convene a confer-
ence in Minsk that would contain 11 countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Be-
larus, Germany, Italy, Russia, the USA, Turkey, France, Czechoslovakia
(later-Finland) and Sweden), as well as the elected representatives of Na-
gorno-Karabakh. However, inasmuch as the hostilities escalated between
the opposing sides the conference was postponed. Even though the con-
ference in Minsk failed, the “Minsk Group” became the only body that
is internationally mandated to promote negotiations and to settle a good
ground for the NK confl ict resolution. 18
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
James Nixey, “The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Infl uence in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia,” Chatham House Briefi ng Paper, (June 2012), 12.
David Laitin and Ronald Suny,“Armenia and Azerbaijan: Thinking a Way out of Kara-
bakh,”Middle East Policy vol. 7, issue No.1 (October 1999), 158.
Zheleznovodsk Declaration, 23 September 1991, http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.
un.org/fi les/Azerbaijan_ZheleznovodskDeclaration1991.pdf (accessed February 10, 2017).
Hakobyan, Karabakh Diary: Green and Black: Neither War nor Peace, 103.
Daniel Druckman and Moorad Mooradian, “Hurting Stalemate or Mediation? The Confl ict
over Nagorno-Karabakh,” Journal of peace research vol. 36, issue No.6 (1999): 710.
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Helsinki Additional Meeting of
the CSCE Council: Summary of Conclusions, 24 March 1992, http://www.osce.org/
mc/29121?download=true (accessed January 8, 2017).
Sergey Minasyan, “Nagorno-Karabakh after Two Decades of Confl ict: Is Prolongation of the
Status Quo Inevitable?” Caucasus Institute, issue No. 2(2010): 28.
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