CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) ContEurVIII2 | Page 26

MANE BABAJANYAN
deployed in the 102nd Russian military base enhance Moscow’s military
presence in the South Caucasus and pose an immediate danger to
Georgia. 18
In contrast to Saakashvili’s administration, the incumbent Georgian
Dream coalition government has adopted a somewhat “balanced policy”
in their relations with Russia 19 since coming to power in 2012,
eliminating the possibility of the exacerbation of tensions between
Armenia and Georgia on geopolitical grounds. However, a pro-Russian
shift in Georgia’s foreign policy is not likely to occur as the latter is still
pursuing its pro-Western policy. 20 Welt states that the current Georgian
government has sought to restore relations mainly in the economic sphere
and has been quite successful (Gеorgian merchandise exports rose from
2% in 2012 to 13% in 2018). 21 In 2013, Russia lifted the embargo on
Georgian exports that had been implemented in 2006. At the same time,
economic reconciliation has not provided a platform for the settlement of
the political problems between Russia and Georgia due to Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. 22 Georgia has been left in a “legal deadlock” as it cannot
re-establish diplomatic relations with Russia unless the latter agrees to
discuss the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity. 23
Another area of contention between Georgia and Russia is the
former’s determination to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community. 24
The NSC clearly states that “one of Georgia’s major foreign and security
policy priorities is membership in NATO and the European Union”. 25 In

Developments. New Challenges and Opportunities in the Realm of Regional Security,
(Tbilisi-Yerevan: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2015), 4-10.
18 Robert E. Hamilton, August 2008 and Everything After: A Ten-Year Retrospective on
the Russia-Georgia War, Foreign Policy Research Institute (2018), 15.
https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/final-bssp-1-hamilton.pdf
19 Paata Gaprindashvili, The Future of Russia-Georgia relations: The need for
comprehensive anti-annexation policy, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and
International Studies and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (2018), 29, https://grass.org.ge/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Georgian-and-Russian-Experts-Searching-for-Ways-of-
Normalization_Eng.pdf.
20 Minasyan, “New Challenges”, 6.
21 Welt, “Georgia”, 13.
22 Gaprindashvili, The Future, 29; Welt, “Georgia”, 13.
23 Hamilton, August 2008, 15.
24 Hayk S. Kotanjyan, HH yev Vrastani Anvtangayin Razmavarakan Shaheri Hamadrman
Problemi Eutyan Masin [About the Essence of the Problem in Coinciding Security
Interests of Armenia and Georgia] in Razmavarakan Anvtangayin Hetazotutyunner.
Yerevan, HH Pashtpanutyan Nakhararutyan D. Kanayani Anvan Azgayin Razmavarakan
Hetazotutyunneri Institut (2008), 453-460.
25 “National Security Concept of Georgia”, https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/2018/pdf/NSC-
ENG.pdf.
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