CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) ContEurVIII2 | Page 27

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) 1994, Georgia joined the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, followed by the 2008 Bucharest Summit where the allies agreed on Georgia’s NАTO membership provided it meet all the necessary requirements. NATO fully supports “territorial integrity and sovereignty within its internationally recognized borders, and cаlls on Russiа to reverse its recognition of the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an independent state.” Furthermore, in 2014, NATO launched a package of specific steps to help Georgia defend itself and prepare for membership. 26 In its turn, Georgia is the fifth top contributor to NATO-led missions. 27 Some authors argue that its traditional anti-Russian orientation determines Georgia's willingness to obtain NATO membership, as it sees a potential threat to its territorial integrity from Russia. 28 Hovhannisyan states that Georgia’s membership in NATO may create an additional dividing line in the South Caucasus, which is not in Armenia’s interests. 29 Armenian and Georgian interests also diverge in the field of regional security. While Georgia pursues NATO membership, Armenia is the only regional member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and views its participation as “a component of its security,” as stated in its NSS. 30 Meanwhile, Armenia also seeks cooperation with NATO, again stated in the former’s NSS. However, in contrast to Georgia, Armenia’s official goal is not gaining membership in NATO but actively participating in the framework of the PfP program. Armenia is also a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and an active contributor to the NATO-led operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo. 31 Apart from its participation in CSTO, Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In 2013, Serzh Sargsyan officially announced                                                              26 “Relations with Georgia”, NATO, Last updated: 26 Mar. 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm. 27 Welt, “Georgia”, 11. 28 Tornike Sharashenidze, “NATO as Viewed from Moscow and Tbilisi” in Georgian and Russian Experts Searching for Ways of Normalization, (Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2018), 38. 29 Nikolay Hovhannisyan,“NATO-in Vrastani Andamaktsutyan Hartsy Hayastani Azgayin Anvtangutyan Tesankyunits [The Question of Georgia’s Membership in NATO from the Perspective of Armenia’s National Security]” in Razmavarakan Anvtangayin Hetazotutyunner. Yerevan, HH Pashtpanutyan Nakhararutyan D. Kanayani Anvan Azgayin Razmavarakan Hetazotutyunneri Institut (2008), 515-525. 30 “National Security Strategy of Armenia”, 2007, https://www.mfa.am/filemanager/Statics/Doctrineeng.pdf. 31 “Relations with Armenia”, NATO, Last updated: 08 Nov. 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_48893.htm. 27