including sustainable agriculture; protection of vulnerable
groups; and investments in health and education.
Other civil society voices seeking to influence the
reconstruction agenda are emerging as well. For example, the
Jesuit Refugee Service in Haiti has organized a Reflection
and Action Unit to mobilize Haitian voices in the plan for
rebuilding Haiti.8
The collective findings and recommendations from
CSOs should be the basis of a dialogue between the Haitian
government and citizens to produce a blueprint that specifies
how foreign aid will be used.
Yet the proposed role of CSOs in the IHRC and the
Haiti Reconstruction Fund is limited. Presently, the Haiti
Reconstruction Fund only allows for CSOs to participate as
“observers”—invited to attend discussions as needed -- while
international donors figure heavily in leadership positions.
A formal working group should be convened to facilitate
the meaningful participation of CSOs, private sector
organizations, and members of the Haitian diaspora in the
design, planning, and implementation of key structures
like the IHRC. These constituencies should be broadly
represented for the long term on the various governing
boards and steering committees. Ultimately, engagement
with Haitian civil society must go beyond consultation;
representatives should have equal voting status in governing
structures.
Ensure transparency. The IHRC will host a public web portal
for information on how donor funds are being managed, and
international NGOs have proposed a web-based mapping
platform to better coordinate their activities. These plans are
encouraging, but a commitment to transparency requires
that donors also cultivate active, sustained relationships with
Haiti-based civil society coalitions.
Information from CSOs on the ground about gaps in
the humanitarian response and other critical issues is often
invaluable—widening the scope of relief efforts and ensuring
that recovery plans are based on what is really happening.
But few formal structures enable local CSOs to access the
Haitian government and outside donors directly.
The U.N. cluster system, a relief-focused coordinating
mechanism for U.N. agencies and NGOs, has proven limited
at best in incorporating Haitian CSOs into its operations.
For various reasons, representatives of Haitian groups
have been denied access to U.N. cluster meetings; also, the
meetings are largely conducted in French, while Haitian
Creole is spoken by 80 percent of the population. An
early post-earthquake report from Refugees International
recommended that the cluster system designate U.N. liaison
officers to build relationships with credible Haitian CSOs
and help disseminate information to camps and affected
communities.9
4 Briefing Paper, August 2010
The IHRC and the Haiti Reconstruction Fund must also
develop clear methods of hearing and responding to local
voices, build liaisons with the Haitian government, support
CSO coordination, and establish a grievance procedure.
Too often, inclusion of civil society in these high-level
structures is limited to representatives of international
organizations based in the capital. In addition to publicizing
aid commitments and donor project plans, the IHRC
should focus on countrywide transparency, encouraging and
supporting the exchange of information among the broadest
possible set of stakeholders.
Balance the need for short-term results with critical long-term
objectives.
Both the Reconstruction Fund and the IHRC are designed
to expedite the recovery and reconstruction process, offering
greater efficiency and streamlined decision-making. But
there is a need to balance the focus on short-term visible
results with a commitment to longer-term systems and
capacity-building. Some of this requires at least a 10-year
time frame.
Because the Haitian government currently lacks key
institutions, strong multilateral reconstruction initiatives
can easily sideline government efforts. But the IHRC is a
temporary structure—it must incorporate transition planning
now in order to ensure timely handover to a well-prepared
Haitian development authority. The IHRC and the Haiti
Reconstruction Fund should prioritize Haitian capacitybuilding in all its functions—using external technical
assistance, a commitment to hiring local staff, and targeted
coordination with relevant government ministries.
More Effective U.S. Leadership in Haiti
The United States has led coordination of the international
relief effort and will likely be its largest donor. Our country
should be clear about its strategy in Haiti.
In order to ensure that U.S. aid is delivered more efficiently
and actually reaches the Haitian people, and begin to make
amends for decades of failed and misguided policies, U.S.
agencies must be equipped to do a better job of delivering
aid and the administration’s pledges for reconstruction must
be fully funded.
Beyond sector-specific priorities, a long-term U.S. strategy
should do three things:
1. Strengthen Haitian government capacity at each stage
of the recovery process.
2. Ensure a coordinated U.S. approach so that our policies
in other areas do not undercut our efforts to reduce
poverty and promote sustainable economic growth.
3. Make long-term development the primary objective.