Ensure that our policies do not work at cross purposes or
undercut each other.
For the foreseeable future, donors, international
nonprofits, and private organizations will be indispensable
in meeting the humanitarian needs in Haiti. With lives
hanging in the balance, the temptation is to work around the
beleaguered Haitian government to get results.
But the Haitian government must establish a visible
presence in the lives of its citizens and public institutions
and regain some capacity to perform its core functions. It
must increasingly take the lead in showing tangible signs of
progress. Strengthening government institutions is a difficult
and time-intensive task, but the emphasis on institutional
capacity-building must start with the recovery and continue
for the long haul.
Donors are quick to point out the constraints which
have thwarted past aid efforts, such as political instability,
bad governance, and weak institutions. Indeed, there is
widespread corruption and some Haitian leaders lack
commitment to effective governance and institutional
capacity-building.
Yet fickle donors and incoherent aid priorities have in turn
undermined the government. A 2006 study by the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) concluded that
more than three decades of donor interventions ended in
failed governance. Gradually, donors wary of the Haitian
government began to manage projects themselves, which
undermined capacity-building and prevented Haitians from
acquiring the management skills necessary for effective
development. NAPA writes, “…So aid projects had less
impact per aid-dollar spent; and again, the government
capacity issue remained.”10 Ultimately, lack of coordination
of assistance contributed to the failure of programs that cost
billions of dollars.
While not a glamorous undertaking, “building Haiti back
better” requires sustained investments in managerial capacity
and public institutions—particularly those with responsibility
for implementing reconstruction programs. USAID is suited
for this longer-term approach and is now working with
the Haitian government to develop a transparent way of
tracking budget flows, along with progress on reconstruction
projects,11 that can help address concerns about corruption.
Key to recovery is helping the government communicate
effectively with citizens, particularly the vast majority who
don’t have access to the Internet. An estimated 1.5 million
people remain displaced and in urgent need of information
on plans for decentralization and relocation. Systems must
be built and managed jointly by the government of Haiti
and CSOs to receive complaints and provide information
essential to transparency, such as donor pledges, disbursed
funds, and project outcomes.
For lasting results, U.S. policies that affect Haiti must not
undercut each other. The dominance of cheap subsidized
rice imported from the United States, much of it given as
food aid, epitomizes the clash of U.S. agricultural trade
policies and poverty-focused development assistance.
www.bread.org
Sara A. Fajardo/CRS
Strengthen Haitian government capacity at each stage of the
recovery process.
J Dieudonné. 9, helps his father Donad, chop leafy branches for
their goats to eat in Wanamet, Haiti. Previously malnourished,
Donad received a goat and multi-vitamins that have helped bring
his life back to normalcy.
From 1995 to 2006, the United States spent $11 billion on
rice subsidies; much of the rice was delivered as food aid to
Haiti and elsewhere. The effect of this is well documented:
the policies protect and enrich U.S. rice farmers while
devastating Haitian rice farmers. Domestic rice accounted
for 47 percent of consumption in Haiti in 1988 but a mere
15 percent by 2008.12 While there is growing consensus
that agriculture reform can fuel economic growth and
reduce poverty, Haiti cannot compete with subsidized U.S.
agribusiness.
An effective U.S. aid policy will encourage local and
regional purchase of food aid and support agricultural
development. The Center for Economic and Policy Research
(CEPR) found that using food aid to support Haitian
agriculture by buying locally produced rice to provide
ongoing relief to about 2 million people would cost just 2.3
percent of the international food aid funds that have been
pledged, yet go a long way to support small-scale farmers.
The United States should commit to buying the current
and next season’s local rice crops at a guaranteed price.13
This would enable us to engage directly with Haitian farmers
via cooperatives and networks to facilitate local purchase and
distribution of rice. It is a clear opportunity to jump-start the
Bread for the World Institute 5