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Comments on Goodman
Jacob Sparks
Goodman presents objections to the standard philosophical and biological accounts of
altruism. Philosophical definitions of altruism depend on intentions: one behaves al-
truistically when they intend to benefit another at a cost to themselves. Biological def-
initions of altruism, in contrast, depend on effects: one behaves altruistically just when
they in fact benefit others at a cost to themselves (regardless of their intentions).
Goodman proposes an alternative account: one acts altruistically when one signals
their willingness to benefit others at a cost to themselves. Altruism, on this view, de-
pends not on intentions or effects, but on what the action communicates. Goodman
claims that this account is superior to the others: it helps to explain the importance of
cultural competency for acting altruistically, it gives a clear explanation of how we
can know when someone is acting altruistically, and shows how altruism might be ex-
plicable in Darwinian terms.
What purpose is a definition of altruism meant to serve? Most philosophers who give
an account of altruism are interested in asking normative questions: Is altruism a vir-
tue? What reasons are there to sacrifice for the sake of others? Do we have obligations
to act altruistically? Biologists, in contrast, see altruism as a puzzle: how can we ex-
plain the altruistic behavior we observe in broadly Darwinian terms? Because of their
different aims, philosophers and biologists usually work with different notions of
‘cost’ and ‘benefit.’ Biologists will understand these concepts in terms of reproductive
success. Philosophers will understand them in terms of some theory of well-being:
pleasure, preference satisfaction, objective lists, etc. The connection between these
two accounts of ‘cost’ and ‘benefit’ is not clear. It may be that the pleasure etc. cova-
ries with reproductive success or not. At any rate, given their different aims and dif-
ferent ways of understanding key terms like ‘cost’ and ‘benefit,’ it’s no surprise that
philosophers and biologists have different working definitions of altruism.
What should we make of Goodman’s proposal in light of these different aims? If we
understand altruism as Goodman recommends – as any behavior that signals one’s
willingness to sacrifice in order to benefit others – will that lead us to a better under-
standing of the normative reasons to be altruistic and will it help to explain the emer-
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