ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1 , January 2018
gence of altruistic behavior ?
Goodman claims to have given a better definition of altruism . But to see the value of his proposal for biology , we should instead see him as having introduced a distinct concept to help explain biological altruism . Perhaps the really puzzling behavior – sacrificing to benefit others – can be explained by the biological benefit of signaling the willingness to sacrifice . Such a proposal is certainly intriguing and may be part of the explanation of altruistic behavior . But we have not replaced the old biological concept with a new and improved version . One needs to retain that old biological concept to state the thesis that demonstrates the importance of Goodman ’ s signaling account .
Likewise for the philosophic question : we should not understand Goodman ’ s proposal as the suggestion that we abandon the concept of altruism as an intention to sacrifice for the sake of others and replace it with Goodman ’ s signaling account . Instead the suggestion must be that we can use the notion of signaling a willingness to sacrifice for others to help to explain our normative reasons to intend to be altruistic . Signaling a willingness to sacrifice for others gives us a reputation as an altruist . Since people tend to reciprocate , such a reputation can benefit us . Insofar as we have reasons to benefit ourselves , we have reasons to signal our willingness to sacrifice for others . And for those of us who have trouble with large scale deception , we won ’ t be able to signal our altruism without actually intending to be altruistic .
This might partly explain our normative reasons to intend to act altruistically . But it probably isn ’ t the whole story . If it were , our reasons to intend to be altruistic would be contingent and instrumental . E . g ., if it turns out that we can fool others into believing our altruistic signal without actually intending to be altruistic , or if earning a reputation for altruism won ’ t result from our intention to act altruistically , or if such a reputation won ’ t benefit us , then we ’ ll have no reason to actually be altruistic . This seems to get the value of other people ’ s well being wrong . In general , our reasons to benefit others are not contingent on whether or not we ourselves will be benefitted in return .
George Price is said to have been disturbed by the implications of his famous formula . Whatever we call altruism , Price thought , is ultimately a product of some selfish evolutionary mechanism . Late in his life , Price was driven to increasingly desperate altruistic behavior , giving away all his wealth and possessions to strangers and , ultimately , taking his life .
Assume that Price was disturbed by the thought that the value of his altruism was undermined by its evolutionary origin . From one perspective , Price ’ s worry seems to rest on an unfortunate mistake . No fact about the origin of our altruistic behavior could have anything to do with the value of our altruistic behavior . To think otherwise is to forget the difference between behaving altruistically ( Goodman ’ s biological altruism ) and having altruistic intentions ( Goodman ’ s philosophical altruism ). It ’ s true that facts about the origin of our altruistic intentions can affect the value of those intentions . For instance , if you intend to act altruistically only because you want some reciprocity , that might impugn the value of your altruistic intention . But just because reciprocity ( or selfishness genes etc .) explains how altruistic behavior arose , it doesn ’ t mean that
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