ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1, January 201 8
nition includes, though does not rely upon, an agent’s intention: one cannot be altruis-
tic where others know one is behaving self-interestedly. This implies that to send an
altruistic signal, others must form a belief about the agent’s intentions – though the
agent’s intentions are not sufficient criteria for others to form this belief.
3. “Animals do not signal in this way if they do not display reciprocal behaviors with
non-kin.”
This paper’s argument does not apply to animal populations where reciprocal altruism
is not observed. If an animal’s helping another can be explained only by kin selection,
the animal’s behavior is nepotistic, and altruism has no sense in this circumstance.
The signal definition of altruism – and therefore altruism generally – is senseless in
communities where reciprocal behaviors to non-kin are not found. It may be, however,
that without understanding the cues animals send to one another in the contexts in
which they are sent, it is impossible to determine whether an animal perceives anoth-
er’s behavior as altruistic.
It is essential to the signal definition of altruism that the benefits of sending this signal
can outweigh the costs to an agent. If – in a population of animals where indirect reci-
procity is found – an agent benefits directly or indirectly from altruistic signals sent,
then the trait of sending altruistic signals will be selected for (Lahti, 2011). The signal
itself is therefore more important than the cost to the agent or the benefit to the recipi-
ent; it will be selected for socially even if there are high immediate costs to an agent.
4. “One can always deceive oneself about whether one is behaving altruistically, so
every signal is potentially false.”
It is enough, for the purposes of this paper, to say that the degree to which one be-
lieves that one is behaving out of altruism directly influences the signal sent to others.
Whether one is deceiving oneself about one’s intentions is therefore irrelevant.
VII. Conclusion
This paper makes the following claims: neither intention, effect, nor intention and ef-
fect provides sufficient criteria for altruistic behavior. Whether one behaves altruisti-
cally, on the revisionist view presented in this paper, depends on the signal one sends
to others: practical understanding of culture is the necessary criterion for communi-
cating one’s altruistic intentions effectively.
This signal view implies that altruism and altruistic behaviors can be exploited to ben-
efit an agent while minimizing the cost to oneself. Practical understanding of how to
behave altruistically is, therefore, a method for exploiting moral systems for Darwini-
an purposes. This pattern of behavior is more likely – for example with academic pub-
lishing – if one is further removed from those with whom one interacts. It should be
taken as a great irony that one can abuse one’s medium for publishing about morality
and altruism to benefit oneself and to exclude others.
16