ASEBL Journal – Volume 10 Issue 1, January 2014
will look ahead to extraordinary gains and so default on any agreement (191).
Nevertheless, we all seem to be programmed not only to be fair but to be generous –
since we expect to be so treated; but paradoxically fairness is rooted in self-interest
(201). Such social interactions depend on theory of mind (nonverbal), which in turn
depends on a brain very different from that of a chimpanzee or our own ancient
ancestors. We are able to detect deception quite well. The human brain has more than
doubled in size over about 1 million years compared with that of a chimpanzee’s.
Pagel suggests that the rapid development of our brain (in quality and not just quantity
– on average Neanderthals had slightly larger brains) explains our survival over all
others (251). The human brain is a super-charged version of Darwin’s descent with
modification. (Some of the more interesting parts are when Pagel discusses Human
Accelerated Regions – 49 in our genome, especially influential in neurons – and socalled junk DNA.) Much of our cooperative behaviors are a direct result of language,
the ability to navigate multi-party transactions. Although we believe that homo
ergaster had very rudimentary speech followed by more advanced speech in late
homo erectus (the larynx), Pagel insists that only our species produced language (at
most 200, 000 years ago) because of “social complexity” and as a “trait for promoting
cooperation . . .” (279, 281). As others (Dunbar) have pointed out, Pagel notes that we
use language (across the globe in 7,000 current forms) not just to speak but
“principally to talk about each other . . .” (294), and this is reflected in key sounds and
word lengths universal for thousands of years.
In his discussion of free will (and returning to the function of consciousness as a
cultural operator), Pagel says that our brains work out patterns ahead of schedule so
that the subconscious might already know what to do in certain instances. This is
relevant since our culturally-hungry brains are always in operation mode, as if on a
sixth sense. Relatedly, an older part of our brain (affective) responds instinctually to
highly charged moral situations – do no harm (329). Clearly, such social sensitivity
has become over time a key cultural ingredient. Interestingly, though, Pagel (citing
Daryl Bem) suggests that we do not know ourselves because of “introspection” but
because of “observing our own behaviors . . .” – and why we often do not know how
we would react in a hypothetical situation (327). Pagel goes on to say that
consciousness is little more than an after effect (of a highly active brain) organizing
input (332) – there might be something illusory about what we label “I.” Yet Pagel
does not seem to be hinting at cultural determinism or the standard social science
model in learning; rather, he seems to suggest that in order for us to imitate and
improve upon behaviors (the cultural tools that have preserved our species), our brains
need to catalogue (seamlessly) various strands of information in advance of our
conscious processing such information.
Finally, coming back to social learning and our ability (need) to connect in clusters,
Pagel notes that in spite of our near obscurity in large cities (some of which date back
almost 8,000 years), Stanley Milgrim’s six degrees of separation (i.e., our proximity to
others) is valid, and, social viscosity, where we form small groups and stay close by
(i.e., “social rules”) has not changed much over our long evolutionary history (365,
367).
- Gregory F. Tague
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