ASEBL Journal – Volume 10 Issue 1, January 2014
began to picture and guess the intent and motives of another – cause and effect of the
highly developed human brain (and hence the ability, above and beyond social
emotions, to make reasoned moral decisions and reflect in conscience on decisions).
So it is important to stress (missed by many self-proclaimed old-fashioned
philosophers) that reason evolved to solve adaptive problems, not to puzzle out freestanding, challenging abstractions about the truth of the universe.
Part four addresses the moral senses. Krebs is clear about how perspective comes into
play in any discussion of the moral senses: typically, we do not feel guilt for another’s
action and we do not experience moral outrage over our own bad actions. The social
behaviors gave rise to duty, ethics arose from norms, and conscience grew from
“emotional reactions” witnessing the antisocial action and subsequent punishment of
others (203). In other words, rather than saying (as many do) moral sense, Krebs says
senses, since it is an approval/disapproval mechanism of feeling and of thought, in
part directed inwardly, in part outwardly, sometimes including thoughts and feelings
prior to a decision, and sometimes only upon reflection. To complicate this picture,
Krebs notes how we can (and do) form moral judgments in other ways (beyond
personal/social emotions and group norms) – namely, by another’s rank, accrued
deeds, and even overall hygienic appearance. Where is rationality in this type of
visceral evaluation? In fact, our moral judgments can be colored by our location (and
its relative cleanliness). This, then, is not merely approval/disapproval but an
evaluation as to the perceived intrinsic worth of something and how it would
(adaptively) help one (or not). Krebs cites a number of researchers here, from Hauser,
to Byrne and Whiten, to Haidt, and de Waal.
Calling on anthropologist A.P. Fiske, Krebs reports that cross-culturally, human
beings categorize social behaviors as “affectionate,” “hierarchical,” “egalitarian,” or
“economic,” and while chimpanzees are capable of the first three, only human beings
can combine all and especially utilize the fourth (220). Our abilities to cooperate are
such that we will alter (even change) our beliefs to do so, and these types of mental
adjustments in social interactions would account for the development of theory of
mind. Once again deferring to the individual, Krebs notes that while there are
universal norms, such norms evolve from the types of moral evaluations individuals
decide to make and keep. The origin of social mores is not in the environment per se,
but the environment of learning will help spread such mores. So while there are innate
(genetic) dispositions that generate a moral culture, that very culture is an essential
prop for the maintenance of such norms (unless it is a purely universal norm, such as
fairness). Culture depends on how any group has decided to solve an adaptive
problem (and hence why the universal notion of sharing will differ in particulars
among cultures).
In part five, human nature, morality, and new models are covered. Krebs cites
research that suggests utilitarian models of morality are cognitively driven whereas
deontological models of morality are emotionally driven. But this type of split is only
superficial because we originated it: human beings “are naturally disposed to help
others . . . [and] to obey rules . . .” (245). Since these tendencies emerge in a social
environment, Krebs is keen to recognize and not dismiss social learning – apparently
it is another of our adaptive functions. If we turn to biologists such as Eva Jablonka
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