ASEBL Journal – Volume 10 Issue 1, January 2014
and Marion Lamb we might be able to include in “social learning” organic-related
elements such as epigenetics and even transmittable behaviors and symbols.
Krebs returns to Kohlberg and, as reluctant as he is, criticizes data that was derived
from studies on only male students in a university setting to hypothetical questions –
i.e., why-type questions which do not reveal one’s moral grounding but instead
become an “intellectual exercise” (265). Krebs cites studies that demonstrate how the
reality of a situation draws responses dramatically different from any theoretical
question/answer (and even more difference occurs between men and women). Think,
for a moment, about all of the ink spilled analyzing over and again Philippa Foot’s
runaway tram scenario (and all of its variations, e.g., the footbridge). Ultimately Krebs
says that while socia l learning is an important part of our cultural mores it does not
account for the origins of moral systems. Staunch evolutionary psychologists such as
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby would suggest that different modules are simply part
of our evolved brain mechanisms, inherited from our ancestral past, which served
adaptive (social) challenges (about, e.g., selfishness and aggression) that increased
fitness.
Krebs admits that putting together the puzzle about the origins of morality is difficult;
since his training was by Kohlberg (in spite of his insistence that he has moved away
from him) we can still see his sensitivity to social learning although he places more
emphasis on evolution. Some will say that evolutionary studies have nothing
substantial to add to the origins of morality, that evolutionary ethics is too theoretical;
but the evidence is available and has been studied by too many biologists and
psychologists (from Hamilton and Axelrod, to Trivers and Alexander) to ignore.
David Haig has gone even further, suggesting, first, the “social gene” and then, later,
“intrapersonal reciprocity” (where, despite conflict, internal gene equilibrium is
reflected in external social equilibrium). Others might dismiss evolutionary studies
altogether, believing that every other part of us (could possibly have) evolved except
for our (divine) brain, and that our ancestral environment (whose remnants are evident
in other behaviors) has nothing to do with our moral sense. Krebs (and others like
him) needs to be commended for his authentic effort, substantial contribution, and
honest courage.
- Gregory F. Tague
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Christopher Boehm. Moral Origins: The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and
Shame. NY: Basic Books, 2012. 432 pgs. $28.99US Hardcover. ISBN: 9780465020485
Going against the grain of individual selection theories (which posit the emergence of
altruism from parental bonds and kin relationships), Christopher Boehm makes a
powerful argument for group (social) selection to account for the advent of altruism.
Paradoxically, according to Boehm, altruism occurred through negatives: punishment
of free-riders and subsequently the fear of public shame (which in turn developed into
conscience). Boehm claims our moral origins lie in the adaptive design (its flexibility
to rules) of the conscience (away from “fear-based” bullying) and its great concern
with maintaining the highest possible personal reputation (176). Drawing from his
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