ASEBL Journal – Volume 10 Issue 1, January 2014
emotions could spread since such high status individuals are quite visible and others
will tend to mimic their actions in order to achieve (realistically or not) a similar level
of fitness and status. There is, nonetheless, some evidence, Robert Wright reminds us,
that pecking orders exist where those in lower ranks are aware of their limits and will
not attempt to rise, so that some version of tit-for-tat could occur between any types.
However, even though altruism and cooperation did (and do) spread, there are those
who will cheat (because of selfish tendencies, lack of self-control, or low status). Yet
a cheater only calls attention to himself and is usually punished (which then highlights
the benefit of cooperative behavior).
On sympathy, Krebs notes that there are cynics who see such positive social emotion
as self-serving; however, Krebs says that some studies have pointed to sympathy as its
own end. Perhaps. But even cooperating or sympathetic behavior that seems wholly
unselfish might come with some (unconscious) expectation of a future gain (or
advantage) in resources or a slight boost in status (even if through the grapevine of
gossip, as Robin Dunbar might suggest). Not to be cynical. Krebs acknowledges that
social emotions (including forgiveness) evolved because of their inclusive fitness
functionality.
Part three includes a discussion of human social behaviors. Compared with other
primates, Krebs notes that what makes us distinctly human is our ability to: “show
deference to abstract ideas . . . suppress selfish behaviors, control aggressive urges,
plan for the future, and delay gratification” (163). These qualities are uniquely
combined in us, among primates, as a species but can vary widely in degree among
individuals, and that matters since morality is dependent on social interactions. We
have always been part of some group, but whereas in our ancestral environment the
cluster was small, later tribal, now it has ballooned from towns and villages to cities
and metropolitan areas – how much of the early forms of group behavior (asks Krebs,
as would any evolutionary psychologist) still linger in us to affect our actions?
Richard Alexander says that indirect reciprocity (“cooperating with cooperators”)
evolved from direct reciprocity. More to the group selectionist thinking, Peter
Richerso n and Robert Boyd would say that there are two types of “social instincts” we
evolved: the individual and the tribal (or cultural selection). Krebs seems to favor
(without discounting other theories) Alexander.
In a large group, the common interest served will suppress the selfish outrider, but
who will do so and will that person be rewarded? Krebs notes that Christopher
Boehm’s account of hierarchy deals with dominance and is externally oriented
whereas Alexander’s account deals with small groups that benefit from direct
reciprocity (mate and kin). Alexander’s main thinking is that direct reciprocity
became indirect (involving three parties) as small groups became larger tribes, and
this behavior spread as more observed its benefits. The problem here is that (even
today) indirect reciprocity is ripe for cheating; however, at the same time, one who
acts fairly and honestly in third party exchanges on a regular basis advances his or her
status and prestige across groups – and that gets noticed (and copied).
Krebs sees this as both individual selection and (then later) cultural. This type of
interaction among people is part of the so-called social intelligence theory where one
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