ASEBL Journal – Volume 10 Issue 1, January 2014
but it is more accurate to say that any moral sense (a sensation) relies on
understanding and emotion. (Many scientists, from Paul Ekman and Joseph LeDoux
to Antonio Damasio have placed emphasis on the role of emotions in reasoning.)
Joshua Greene and Marc Hauser (to name only two) have written about the degree of
cognition in moral behavior (Greene seeing more cognition involved in such processes
than Hauser, though we are now splitting hairs). Darwin leans too much to the
consequences (or common good) of moral acts and ignores intentions. Certainly this is
a complex area, and even Adam Smith, before modern psychology, noted that not
only could one have conflicting motives before acting, but one could also have bad
intent and yet (seem to) act with care.
In part two the primitive behaviors are covered in terms of hierarchy, self-control,
altruism, and cooperation. Without stating anything with absolute certainty, Krebs
suggests that “perspective taking and moral reasoning” probably evolved in primate
cultures (seen even to this day) that relied on hierarchy and status as part of their
social structure (75). In other words, fighting for a resource is risky and a waste of
energy (to say nothing of the fact that one might not gain the prize). Hence we see the
origins of deferential strategies (where resources are relinquished to the more
powerful or one of high status). Krebs links facts that, first, those in high ranking
positions have greater degrees of neurohormonal chemicals (serotonin, vasopressin,
testosterone) and, second, are better (than subordinates) in reading minds. He cites
work done by, e.g., Christopher Boehm, who ultimately sees the spread of egalitarian
attitudes in early human species, in this regard. Self-control (especially individual
differences in the modulation of desire and aggression) comes into play here, since
over the long haul (in evolution) the accretion of results is what matters, and it seems
clear that behaviors selected for include self-regulation and cooperation – one by one
individuals successful in maintaining those behaviors would have had consistently
greater mating choices and success than aggressive, lone-wolf cheaters.
In terms of altruism, the driving forces are sexual selection, kin selection, and group
selection. Darwin, for example, emphasized reproductive adaptations over those of
survival. Since so much care is involved in raising young, early human beings found
attractive those who would help both mate and offspring. E.O. Wilson in 1975
(Sociobiology) really framed the question by asking how we can account for altruism
(giving) in light of natural selection (fitness). Why would I want to help you if there is
no benefit to me? While there is, at base, an investment in genes, there is no “costbenefit analyses” when it comes to altruistic (kin) behavior: it is spontaneous and
emotional (113) – much of what Hume and Hauser suggest. For the group selectionist,
Krebs notes that through time (group against group), altruism will succeed over purely
exploitive behaviors (though others might say that on this level it is really once again
only kin selection).
Altruistic behaviors (sharing, flexible tit-for-tat, or mutual aid) ultimately benefit the
individual and the group, so those less fit will observe and copy (by deference) those
in higher ranks (who most likely exhibit altruistic behaviors, even if the motive is for
self gain). There is, for instance according to Gilbert Roberts, competitive altruism
(raising status). Since those in higher ranks will tend to maximize their fitness (as
natural selection demands) through cooperative adaptations, altruism and social
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